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IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL WARMING ON STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AND ARCTIC RESOURCES
UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA:
HOW THE ARCTIC IS NO LONGER COMMUNIS
OMNIUM NATURALI JURE 1
Parker Clote*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Arctic region has long been an area of singular potential,
possessing both a sui generis geography and an invaluable supply of
natural resources. Yet this potential has long remained unrealized
and speculative, owing to the Arctic's harsh climate and the absence of
any cognizable claim of sovereignty. Recently, however, global warm-
ing and a worldwide scramble for new energy sources have made the
Arctic the most recent strategic cynosure of international law. With
various State governments and private entities eyeing unprecedented
levels of access as the ice retreats, the Arctic is witnessing "nothing
less than a great rush for virgin territory and natural resources worth
hundreds of billions of dollars."'
As a matter of course, the revived interest in the Arctic impli-
cates the only international legal regime that purports to administer
the region: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS"). A comprehensive multilateral treaty, UNCLOS not only
establishes general normative standards of conduct, but also governs
the extent of national maritime sovereignties. Due to its position as
the polestar of maritime law, the Convention's limits on State sover-
eignty ostensibly will be used to inform the process of allocating newly-
available Arctic resources.
However, with so much at stake, the seemingly obvious task of
simply applying UNCLOS to the Arctic is belied by the potential reper-
cussions of delimitating sovereignty improperly or in a way that is per-
1 The second century Roman jurist Marcianus is attributed this quote regarding
the oceans as being "common or open to all men by the operation of natural law."
Peter Prows, Tough Love: The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of UNCLOS
Property Law (And What Is To Be Done About It), 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 241, 249
(2007).* J.D. candidate 2010, University of Richmond School of Law.
2 Clifford Krauss et al., As Polar Ice Turns to Water, Dreams of Treasure Abound,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/10/
science/l0arctic.html.
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ceived as illegitimate, especially among countries so close in proximity.
Indeed, a discernible lack of political unity and uncertainty under UN-
CLOS has developed over the years, preceding the increasingly unpre-
dictable effects of climate change and the novelty of an open Arctic
Ocean.
Further, economic affinities3 have shaped international mari-
time policy to a great degree in recent decades, supplanting the tradi-
tional conception of the oceans as a universally-accessible resource.4
In the Arctic especially, competition over previously inaccessible re-
sources has emerged as the prism through which sovereign interest is
expressed. Thus, despite nearly universal participation in the regime,
as global warming continues to reshape the character of Arctic dis-
putes, it complicates the role of UNCLOS itself as well.
This Comment focuses on how the record melting of the Arctic
ice has rekindled avid international interest in the region, and which
sovereign nations might have the most viable claim to the exploration
and exploitation of Arctic seabed resources under the administration
of UNCLOS.
Section II chronicles the evolution of the Convention and pro-
vides an overview of the pertinent provisions of the treaty, including
sovereign maritime rights, the extent of a coastal State's jurisdiction,
and subsequent modifications to the original version of UNCLOS. Sec-
tion III will examine several deficiencies that are likely to arise within
the Arctic context. Section IV discusses the status of claims to the Arc-
tic and which countries might have a recognized legal claim of sover-
eign rights under UNCLOS. Finally, Section V will evaluate the
United States' objections to the Convention against the continuing ad-
monition that America should ratify UNCLOS. The Comment con-
cludes that UNCLOS, although perhaps not ideal, is the only extant
international agreement capable of governing the disputing claims of
Arctic sovereignty that will arise due to global warming.
A. Historical Overview of the Arctic and State Interest
The Arctic region consists of the North Pole, the Arctic Ocean,
and the area demarcated by the Arctic Circle, an imaginary line that
marks the latitude above which the sun does not set on the day of the
summer solstice and does not rise on the day of the winter solstice.'
There are five countries with coastal territory within the Arctic Circle,
3 Prows, supra note 1, at 263.
4 See Kevin V. Cook, The Discovery of Lunar Water: An Opportunity to Develop a
Workable Moon Treaty, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 647, 685 (1999).
5 See NAT'L SNOW AND ICE DATA CTR., WHAT IS THE ARCTIC?, http://nsidc.org/arc-
ticmet/basics/arcticdefinition.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
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referred to collectively as the Arctic Nations: the United States (via
Alaska), Denmark (via Greenland), Canada, Russia, and Norway. 6
The most important strategic and natural resource of the re-
gion, the Arctic Ocean, lies mostly to the north of the Arctic Circle.
Spanning an area less than twice the size of the United States, it is the
smallest of the world's five oceans.7 Yet despite its diminutive size,
the Arctic is extraordinarily unique. Geographically, the Arctic serves
as a northern epicenter, bringing together the borders of the United
States, Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark. Finland, Sweden, and
Iceland also surround the Arctic, but do not have a littoral coast. As a
result, several commercially and strategically important waterways
are enclosed by the Arctic, and their access varies greatly depending
on seasonal changes.' The region also boasts extensive untapped gas,
petroleum, and mineral deposits, as well as a pristine livestock market
devoid of well-established regulations.
Historically, the Arctic was open to all nations for fishing and
navigation, at least in theory, until the twentieth century and the ad-
vent of the modern warfare. During World War II, the Arctic was used
extensively by the Axis powers since it was the shortest submarine
route between Russia and North America.9 In the aftermath of the
War, Canada and the United States erected defense projects to fore-
stall perceived Soviet threats. 10 Throughout the Cold War, the Arctic
Circle served as a strategic area from which to monitor nuclear subma-
rine movement." However, the importance of the Arctic faded when
its limited use as a tactical outpost was no longer needed. In fact, after
the Cold War, most nations simply lost interest in the Arctic. 12
6 Stephanie Holmes, Comment, Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic
Sovereignty, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 323, 326 (2008).
7 Central Intelligence Agency, The 2008 World Factbook, available at https:/!
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xq.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Arctic World Factbook].
8 Global warming will expand access to the Arctic's seasonal waterways such as
the renowned Northwest Passage between America and Canada and the Northern
Sea Route connecting Eurasia. Currently these passageways are only open to nav-
igation a few scant weeks during the summer. Id.; see also Andrew King, Note,
Thawing a Frozen Treaty: Protecting United States Interests in the Arctic with a
Congressional-Executive Agreement on the Law of the Sea, 34 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 329, 330-31 (2007). Other important bodies of water include the southern
Chukchi Sea, which is the "major chokepoint" for northern access to the Pacific via
the Bering Strait, the Barents Sea, the Beaufort Sea, and Hudson Bay. See Arctic
World Factbook, supra note 7.
9 Holmes, supra note 6, at 328.
10 Id.
"1 James Stuhltrager, Global Climate Change and National Security, 22 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T 36, 39 (2008).
12 id.
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No regional treaty was ever created to address control over
Arctic resources, and an inimical climate traditionally has prevented
any unilateral exercise of jurisdiction or regulatory enforcement.
Snow cover in the Arctic region lasts ten months of the year, and its
central surface is covered by a drifting icepack that is three meters
thick. 3 While the Arctic ice sheet is surrounded by open seas in the
summer, it more than doubles in size each winter, extending to the
encircling landmasses and remaining locked from October to June.14
Nevertheless, the Arctic has remained quietly significant, pre-
cisely because its geography has continued to defy any recognized
claim of national jurisdiction over its resources and passageways.
However, the possibilities brought about by global warming have
caused new uses of the Arctic to be contemplated. The Arctic is not a
continental landmass like Antarctica. If the surface ice disappears, so
too does the most significant physical impediment to the exploitation
of its resources.
B. The Implications of Global Warming on UNCLOS in the Arctic
Due to customary standards of international law and obvious
logistical constraints, previous attempts to lay claim to areas of the
Arctic have amounted merely to symbolic gestures of sovereignty or
abstract academic debates.'" Global warming, however, recently has
made the Arctic the focus of disproportionate international interest
relative to its size. However, as the region becomes more accommodat-
ing to surface navigation, it appears increasingly vulnerable to poten-
tial for conflicts to develop at a commensurate pace.16 Peter Croker,
the current chair of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf (CLCS), has remarked that the Arctic is "'the only place where a
number of countries encircle an enclosed ocean.'"' 7 There is also sig-
13 Arctic World Factbook, supra note 7.
14 Id.
'5 For example, relying on variations of a claim from 1909, Canada attempted to
enforce its Arctic Pollution Act against U.S. vessels in 1969, after the American
tanker Manhattan navigated the Northwest Passage. Despite the politically sen-
sitive overtones, the policy that emerged to govern the central issue of vessel-
source pollution deliberately skirted the topic of pollution zones beyond a nation's
recognized territorial sea; the issue proved merely a display of political bravado.
See Donald R. Rothwell, The Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage Dispute: A Reas-
sessment, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 331, 366 (1993); ANN L. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 274-76 (1981).
16 Andrew C. Revkin, A Push to Increase Icebreakers in the Arctic, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/world/europe/17
arctic.html.
17 Paul Reynolds, The Arctic's New Gold Rush, BBC NEWS, Oct. 25, 2005, availa-
ble at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4354036.stm.
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nificant overlap between the five Arctic States, and it is a region long
characterized by tension.1 8
By September 2005, the Arctic ice cap had shrunk to the small-
est size ever recorded, 9 and scientists predict that continued melting
will eventually open up a seasonal sea nearly five times the size of the
Mediterranean.2" With the receding Arctic ice comes the possibility to
excavate, for the first time, deep seabed mineral deposits and fuel
sources on the sea floor, estimated by the United States Geological
Survey to account for a quarter of the world's undiscovered oil and gas
reserves." If current trends continue, increasing temperatures will
further reduce the polar ice caps, making vast new areas available for
the exploitation of scant natural resources.22
The Arctic Nations have responded by levying exclusive claims,
leaving political and diplomatic tensions in the wake of a sprint to
claim polar resources. Currently, the littoral states surrounding the
Arctic are engaged in various stages of establishing competing claims
of sovereignty over large swaths of the region, attempting to demon-
strate the limits of their continental shelves beyond 200 nautical
miles23 in order to prove control.
Here again the geography of the Arctic itself forecasts the in-
fluential role to be played by the Convention: the region that is becom-
ing more accessible due to the thinning ice is precisely the areas of the
continental margin within the Arctic Circle that lie beyond national
jurisdictions. The outer border of this region roughly coincides, in
ironic fashion, with the 200 nautical-mile default limit on exclusive
economic rights.24 Further complicating the imbroglio, about fifty per-
cent of the Arctic deep seafloor is connected to more than one Arctic
State via the continental shelf, the highest percentage of any ocean.25
II. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA
The intensification of old maritime practices and the discovery
of new utilities during the twentieth century highlighted the need for a
18 Id.
19 King, supra note 8, at 330.
20 Arctic World Factbook, supra note 7.
21 See Krauss et al., supra note 2.
22 Stuhltrager, supra note 11, at 37.
23 Arctic World Factbook, supra note 7.
24 For a "political" rendering of the jurisdictional boundaries as they stand cur-
rently, see INT'L BOUNDARIES RES. UNIT, DURHAM UNIVERSITY, MARITIME JURISDIC-
TION AND BOUNDARIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION, available at www.dur.ac.uk/
resources/ibru/arctic.pdf.25 Arctic World Factbook, supra note 7.
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new, more unified approach to the law of the sea.2 6 Especially in the
aftermath of the Cold War, technological innovation and the globaliza-
tion of the free trade paradigm and capitalist ideals2" cast a world-
wide diaspora of changes in geopolitical policy that included the law of
the sea.28 Essentially, modern political and technological develop-
ments began to foment a paradigm shift in the approach to the law of
the sea, wrought out of issues framed by exclusive sovereignty rather
than the traditional principle of unfettered freedom. Accordingly, UN-
CLOS responded in comparable terms, devoting significant effort to
differentiating among the nature of the rights pertaining to different
areas of the oceans.
The evolution of a comprehensive body of international mari-
time law proved a labyrinthine and protracted effort. The negotiations
that produced the version of UNCLOS now in force lasted eight years,
and were preceded by many piecemeal conventions of varying degrees
of success, as well as two previous failed efforts by the UN to codify a
comprehensive body of international maritime law.2 9 Even after it be-
came clear that a new legal order was needed, negotiating the integral
provisions of the Convention required the efforts of delegates from over
149 countries over the course of eleven decision-making sessions.3 ° By
1982, the final version of UNCLOS had endured twelve years of diplo-
matic posturing before gaining the support of enough countries to
enter into force in 1994.
Ultimately, UNCLOS has been met with overwhelming inter-
national approval.3 1 Eventually entering into force in November of
1994, UNCLOS has become a comprehensive and authoritative "con-
stitution" of the seas, governing "nearly every aspect of maritime law,
including [territorial] sovereignty limits, navigation, seabed mining,"3 2
international rights of passage, environmental safeguards, and many
26 HOLLICK, supra note 15, at 9.
27 Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The
Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 709, 732 (1999).
28 See Harry N. Scheiber, Japan, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the Pacific
Fisheries: A Perspective on the Origins of Modern Ocean Law, 1930-1953, 6 SAN
DIEGO INT'L L.J. 27, 30 (2004).
29 NATALIE KLEIN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
THE SEA 16-20 (2005).
30 SUZETE V. SUAREZ, THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: LEGAL As-
PECTS OF THEIR ESTABLISHMENT 43, 73 (2008).
31 See Howard S. Schiffman, United States Membership in UNCLOS: What Ef-
fects for the Marine Environment?, 11 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 477, 478 (2005).
32 Holmes, supra note 6, at 330-31.
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other fundamental issues.3 3 Over 140 States currently are parties to
the Convention, 34 and a record 119 countries signed UNCLOS on the
first day it was open to signature.35 The Convention has been ratified
by all of the Arctic Nations, as well as every permanent member of the
UN Security Council, except for the United States.3 6
A. The Evolution of UNCLOS-A Departure from mare liberum
The principle of mare liberum-the freedom of the seas-is
generally considered to be the founding principle of international mar-
itime law.37 This primeval maritime doctrine rested on the secular
philosophical contention that, as a condition of nature rather than di-
vine law, the high seas were inherently common to all men and there-
fore not susceptible to claims of exclusivity.3 8 The tenets of mare
liberum endured nearly five centuries of maritime developments virtu-
ally unchallenged.3 9 Indeed, the "[h]istory of the law of the sea is to a
large extent the story of the development of [the] freedom of the seas
doctrine and the vicissitudes through which it has passed through the
centuries."4 o
The doctrine itself originated in Roman times, 4 ' but it was left
for a jurist from the Netherlands to revive its international obser-
vance.4 2 In the early seventeenth century, the Dutch scholar and in-
ternational lawyer Hugo Grotius published what is generally
33 Candace L. Bates, U.S. Ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea: Passive Acceptance is Not Enough to Protect U.S. Property Interests, 31 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 745, 745 (2006).
34 Id. at 746.
35 Recent Development, A Review of Developments in Ocean and Coastal Law
2001-2002, 7 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 367, 387 (2002).
36 Bates, supra note 33, at 746.
37 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 5; see also Arnaut, infra note 46, at 27.38 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 9-10 (I.A. Shearer ed.,
Clarendon Press 1982). Many rejoinders to the notion of mare liberum were writ-
ten, attacking both its secular underpinnings as well as its conclusion. One of the
main opponents to Grotius' theory was the English jurist John Selden. Id. at 10.
See generally JOHN SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM: OF THE DOMINION, OR, OWNERSHIP OF
THE SEA (Marchmont Nedham trans., The Lawbook Exchange 2004) (1652).
39 O'CONNELL, supra note 38, at 29. Even in modern times it persists, as virtually
every international maritime legal regime, including UNCLOS, has attempted to
preserve some vestige of equal access to the high seas. See generally KLEIN, supra
note 29, at 5-28 (describing the historical context of the doctrine).
40 Ram P. Anand, Freedom of the Seas: Past, Present and Future, in LAW OF THE
SEA 261, 261 (Hugo Caminos ed., 2001).
41 The Justinian Code of 529 A.D. did not extend authority into the oceans, merely
limiting control to the "high-water mark." BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 849 (Aspen Publishers 5th ed. 2007).
42 Anand, supra note 40, at 262.
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considered the first authoritative treatise espousing the doctrine of the
freedom of the seas.4 3
Attempting to secure Dutch maritime rights in the Indies
against Portuguese and Spanish dominance, Grotius rejected the no-
tion of mare clausum-a closed sea-as an illegitimate exercise of sov-
ereignty.44 Rather, he advocated that maritime rights were common
among all nations, regardless of the authority of any other sovereign
ranging from the individual to the papacy.4" The only possible excep-
tion to the proscription against exclusive maritime rights was reserved
for the waters immediately adjoining a coastal State.4 6
Within this context of maritime law, prior to UNCLOS a na-
tion-state "legally" could advance its national maritime interests to the
extent that it was able to enforce such jurisdiction. However, outside
practical boundaries, the high seas were considered either res com-
munis or res nullius, alternately belonging to everyone or to no one,
depending on the viewpoint to which a nation adhered.4 ' For all in-
tents and purposes, the exploitation and use of ocean resources func-
tioned entirely independently from claims of national sovereignty.
By modern times, this economic and political global commons
paradigm4 s was still accepted as the prevailing jus gentium around
which the validity of all other rules governing interstate maritime con-
duct revolved.4 9 Nevertheless, during the twentieth century, changes
in the geopolitical climate, technology, economics, and society in gen-
eral rendered complete freedom of the seas untenable and anachronis-
tic.5 ° The range of ocean uses was expanding at a level commensurate
with economic developments, and national interests came to bear on
the extent of maritime sovereignty and ocean resources rather than
freedom of navigation. In particular, discoveries of deep seabed natu-
ral resources and improved technologies to exploit them "lea to in-
13 See generally HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH
BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE (James Brown
Scott ed., Ralph Van Deman Magoffin, trans., The Lawbook Exchange 2001)
(1916).
" KLEIN, supra note 29, at 5-6.
'5 GROTIUS, supra note 43, at 15-25.
46 Damir Arnaut, Stormy Waters on the Way to the High Seas: The Case of the
Territorial Sea Delimitation Between Croatia and Slovenia, 8 OCEAN & COASTAL
L.J. 21, 27-28 (2002).
47 See Alexandre Kiss, The Common Heritage of Mankind: Utopia or Reality?, in
LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 40 at 323, 323.
48 HOLLICK, supra note 15, at 9.
49 Anand, supra note 40, at 261.
50 See Prows, supra note 1, at 247-48.
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creasing claims of exclusive control over wider areas of the sea
adjacent to coastal States."'"
Recognizing the burgeoning international concern for sover-
eignty over parts of the oceans, as well as the need for peaceful and
communal exploitation of certain resources, the UN General Assembly
issued a resolution that convened the first United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea in 1958.52 Various multilateral conventions
were negotiated regarding the high seas, international fisheries, the
continental shelf, and dispute settlement.5 3 However, when these
proved insufficient to meet emerging issues, it became clear that a
more comprehensive approach was necessary. A second Conference on
the Law of the Sea two years later again sought to resolve the conten-
tious issues, in particular the breadth of the territorial sea and the
classification of international straits, but ultimately proved fruitless.5 4
Prompted by the failure to settle these inveterate and polemic
issues, a third Conference on the Law of the Sea was held in Caracas
in 1974 and Geneva in 1975, eventually resulting in the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea that passed the United Na-
tions on December 10, 1982." In the final version of UNCLOS, a
relatively compendious, unified body of international maritime law
was finally produced.
The fundamental platform of UNCLOS purports to maintain
the balance between sovereign rights and Grotius' freedom of the
seas. 56 However, the new Convention carved out substantial new sov-
51 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 12. The advancements in technology also led States to
assert claims over other ocean resources, most particularly fish. The development
of deep water fishing fleets, equipped with sonar and mechanized canneries, al-
lowed the seas to be used increasingly as a source of food. Id.
52 G.A. Res. 1105, 2, U.N. GAOR, lth Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/3572
(1957).
53 See, e.g., Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285,
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, Optional Protocol to the 1958 Law of the Sea Con-
ventions concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 29, 1958, 450
U.N.T.S. 169. See generally KLEIN, supra note 29, at 1-28.
54 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 18.
55 See generally Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, opened
for signature Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-39 (1994), 1833 U.N.T.S. 397,
21 I.L.M. 1245, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm (follow "United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" hyperlink) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
56 It has been argued that while Grotius opposed the conception of mare clausum
and outright ownership of the seas, he drew a distinction between such a proprie-
tary ownership (dominium) and the power of a State to rule its own coastal waters
(imperium). This latter concept is more analogous to the modern understanding of
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ereign rights over various parts of the world's oceans. Most of these
prerogatives were secured at the expense of the traditional concept of
universal freedom of the seas, essentially codifying its erosion.5" The
most novel of these was a provision granting exclusive economic rights
out to 200 nautical miles from a State's coastline."8 Far from allowing
universal access to the sea, this 200-mile zone explicitly reserves 37.7
million square nautical miles for the exclusive use of individual States,
an area containing an estimated 90 percent of the exploitable fishery
stock, around 85 percent of known oil deposits, and 10 percent of the
seabed manganese nodules.59
Although UNCLOS is a significant departure from Grotius' no-
tion of mare liberum, it has been hailed nonetheless as a celebration of
human solidarity.6" It is truly a singular international achievement in
light of its scope, levels of dispute resolution, and the marathon negoti-
ations that yielded such significant balancing of interests. 6 1
B. The Provisions of UNCLOS: the Territorial Sea, Exclusive
Economic Zone, and Continental Shelf
The Convention codified several essential maritime concep-
tions of jurisdiction. First, UNCLOS established a "territorial sea" of
twelve nautical miles, as measured from a country's coastal baseline.62
As suggested by its name, the territorial sea essentially functions as
an extension of a State's territory.6 3 States Parties to the Convention
not only exercise exclusive control over their territorial seas, but they
also retain full sovereignty over the air space above, the seabed below,
its superjacent waters, as well as all living and inanimate resources.64
The only exception to the absolute sovereignty of the territorial
sea is the obligation to permit the "continuous and expeditious" inno-
maritime jurisdiction, as opposed to complete sovereignty, and it is precisely the
distinction UNCLOS seeks to create in the areas beyond the territorial sea, espe-
cially in the "uneasy coincidence of the high seas and the exclusive economic zone."
See O'CONNELL, supra note 38, at 14-16.
57 Anand, supra note 40, at 276.
58 M.K. Nawaz, On the Advent of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Implications For a
New Law of the Sea, in LAW OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND 180, 180-81 (Ram
Prakash Anand ed., 1980).
59 CARTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 888.
60 See Tommy T.B. Koh, Conference President, Remarks at the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea (Dec. 6 & 11, 1982), available at http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/convention overviewconvention.
htm.
61 Schiffman, supra note 31, at 477.
62 UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 2.
63 Id. art. 3.
64 Id. art. 2.
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cent passage of foreign vessels.6 5 It is important to note also that a
State's full sovereignty ends in the maritime zones beyond the territo-
rial sea.6 6
The Convention also provides for an unprecedented concept in
the exclusive economic zone ("EEZ"), 67 which extends to a maximum of
200 nautical miles, as measured from the same coastline as the territo-
rial sea.6" Within the EEZ, a State may exercise preferential rights
and jurisdiction only over the natural resources in, on, and below the
seabed and the superjacent waters, and maintains exclusive economic
rights to exploit, conserve, and manage that zone.69 Sovereign rights
to resources may also be exercised "with regard to other activities for
the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the pro-
duction of energy."7
Finally, what constitutes a State's continental shelf, and the
pertinent sovereign rights over the sea floor and subsoil, is the most
important designation within the context of the changing Arctic. In
general, entitlement to submarine resources under the Convention is
based inextricably on the delimitation of the continental shelf and the
idea that the shelf is a natural prolongation of a coastal State's terri-
tory.7 ' Whereas the principles underlying the territorial sea and EEZ
are largely premised on sovereign rights that can be exercised or en-
forced fairly easily, UNCLOS compensates for resources on the conti-
nental shelf that are not immediately within reach, but still
technically belonging to a coastal State.7 2
65 Id. art. 18(2).
66 See Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, International Law's Unhelpful Role in the
Senkaku Islands, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 903, 910 (2008). Compare UNCLOS, supra
note 55, art. 2 (specifically employing the term "sovereignty") with id. art. 56(1)
(employing the terms "sovereign rights" and "jurisdiction" as opposed to"sovereignty").
67 See KLEIN, supra note 29, at 130-31; Nawaz, supra note 58, at 188-89.
68 UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 57.
69 Id. art. 56.
70 SHIGERU ODA, Exclusive Economic Zone, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
621, 625 (2003).
71 See UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 76(1), 77(3).
72 The Convention states explicitly that the rights of a coastal State over the conti-
nental shelf do not depend on occupation or even any express proclamation. Id.
art. 77(3).
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1. The Continental Shelf Defined
In geologic terms, the continental shelf is the nearest part of
the offshore, submerged prolongation of land territory.7 3 The conti-
nental shelf, slope, and rise are known collectively as the continental
margin, which has considerable variation worldwide.7 4 Generally
though, the shelf is the relatively shallow part of the continental mar-
gin lying between the shoreline and the shelf break-essentially the
area where there is no noticeable slope, usually located at a depth be-
tween 100 and 200 meters.7 5
For the purposes of the Convention, the continental shelf is
comprised of "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that ex-
tend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of
its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a
distance of 200 nautical miles."76 Under the UNCLOS regime, a State
is afforded "a continental shelf of 200 miles regardless of technological
capabilities and geological formations. 7 7 Should a State's continental
shelf extend beyond 200 miles, it may claim an extension up to the
outer edge of the continental margin. However, such a boundary claim
cannot exceed 350 nautical miles, as measured from the same coastal
baseline as the territorial sea, or, alternately 100 nautical miles be-
yond the 2500-meter isobath (an imaginary contour line drawn along
the continental shelf at a constant depth of 25,000 meters).7
Thus, it is only in the case of the "geological construct of the
continental shelf extending beyond 200 miles may a legal continental
shelf of up to 350 miles be recognized."7 9 The simplest conception
under the Convention, therefore, is a country with a very narrow conti-
nental shelf that does not extend to 200 nautical miles. In such a case,
the coastal State may still claim sovereign rights over seabed re-
sources to that distance, but no further, exercising concurrent jurisdic-
tion within its EEZ to exploit livestock as well within that area.
Absent recognition of an extended continental shelf, any terri-
tory lying beyond the outer boundary of 200 miles is referred to as "the
73 Robert Smith, The Continental Shelf Commission, in OCEANS POLICY: NEW IN-
STITUTIONS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 135, 137 (Myron H. Nordquist et al.,
eds. 1999).
74 Id. at 138.
75 THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (CLSC), THE CON-
TINENTAL SHELF, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs new/continentalshelfdescrip-
tion.htm#definition (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) [hereinafter CLCS].
76 UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 76(5).
77 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 130 n.15.
78 UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 76(5); see also ODA, supra note 70, at 595, 618.
79 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 130 n.15.
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Area" throughout UNCLOS. ° It is defined as the "seabed and ocean
floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,""s
which stands at 200 nautical miles unless proven to extend farther.8 2
The Area and all of its seabed resources instead are reserved for "the
common heritage of mankind" and vested in mankind as a whole. s3
2. Rights over the Continental Shelf
The natural resources of the continental shelf are defined as
the immobile or seabed-dwelling living organisms at a harvestable
stage as well as mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed
and subsoil.84 UNCLOS Article 77 confers sovereign rights on a
coastal State for the purpose of exploration and exploiting such re-
sources, arguably the most important of which is the "exclusive right
to authorize and regulate drilling on the continental shelf for all pur-
poses"85 in order to harvest the resources.
UNCLOS premises jurisdiction over these deep seabed re-
sources, even if not logistically susceptible to possession, on preserving
the resources that are naturally part of a coastal State's geography.86
As the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has noted, the continental
shelf itself is a stretch of "submerged land" governed by a legal regime
that focuses on soil and subsoil, terms that are themselves evocative of
the land and not the sea.8 7 Since the rights of the continental shelf
under UNCLOS emanate from its conception as a natural extension of
sovereign territory, the appertaining rights to its resources are justi-
fied in terms of a State's sovereignty over land. Accordingly a State's
sovereign rights are restricted to resources that would be analogous to
those harvested from land, i.e. resources found on the seabed rather
than the waters above it.88 Indeed, the rights of a coastal State exist
independently and "do not depend on occupation.., or on any express
proclamation" under the Convention.8 9
Nevertheless, these rights are not limitless. The term "sover-
eign rights" is a deliberate phrase, used to specify that the circum-
scribed authority granted over the shelf would be compatible with the
80 See UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 1(1).
81 Id. (emphasis added).
82 Id. art. 76(4)(a).
83 Id. art. 136.
84 Id. art. 77.
85 Id. art. 81.
86 O'CONNELL, supra note 38, at 467.
87 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 51 (Feb.
28).
88 See UNCLOS, supra note 55, arts. 77(4), 78(1).
89 Id. art. 77(3).
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principle of the freedom of the seas.9 ° Other nations are precluded
from pursuing activities without the express consent of the coastal
State, but that State's exercise of sovereign rights cannot interfere
with the legal status of the superjacent waters, the airspace above, or
rights of other States, such as the ability of any State to lay submarine
cables.9 1
C. The Common Heritage of Mankind: A New Economic Order
Based on Polymetallic Nodules
Somewhat ironically, among the manifold number and diver-
sity of ocean resources, vast beyond imagination, it was the discovery
of fist-sized mineral deposits that effectively changed everything. In
the 1960s it was determined that "deposited wealth, valuable beyond
imagination, [existed] in the continental slope" and beyond.9 2 Com-
monly referred to as manganese nodules, these deposits contain signif-
icant quantities of important minerals such as "nickel, copper, cobalt,
and manganese . . .found at depths of 12,000 to 20,000 feet, well re-
moved from continental margins."93
In fact, the areas beyond national jurisdictions contain an esti-
mated 22 billion tons of polymetallic nodules, but located on the ocean
floor at the impractical depth of approximately three miles.94 Never-
theless, once the presence of such mineral wealth was made known, it
proved a contentious point of departure for international maritime pol-
icy that remains today.
For all intents and purposes, the so-called first in time, first in
right theory governed exploitation of seabed resources prior to UN-
CLOS. President Truman, for example, declared in 1945 that the
United States retained jurisdiction and control over all new sources of
fuel and other resources on its continental shelf, regardless of proxim-
ity to the coastline.9 5 By the time the United States became a party to
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,9 6 any nation
that developed adequate mining technology conceivably was able to ex-
cavate the sea floor beyond its boundaries, even to the middle of the
ocean if so desired. 97
Once offshore technology was developed to harvest the manga-
nese nodules from the ocean floor and continental shelf, claims of ex-
90 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 129.
9' UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 79.
92 ODA, supra note 70, at 257, 259.
93 HOLLICK, supra note 15, at 8.
94 See KLEIN, supra note 29, at 317.
95 Exec. Order No. 9633, 10 Fed. Reg. 12305 (Sept. 28, 1945).
96 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 53.
97 HOLLICK, supra note 15, at 8.
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clusive control over wider areas of the sea increased drastically.98 The
U.S. was soon joined by other countries seeking to supplement their
domestic resources with eighty-one countries making 231 jurisdic-
tional claims under the previous international convention governing
the continental shelf between 1967 and 1973. 99 The debate over who
was entitled to lay claim to offshore resources, and how disputes might
be settled, came to dominate the UNCLOS proceedings. 100 Eventually
it was determined that a new international structure was needed to
ensure maritime justice in conformity with the international norm of
the equality of sovereign rights.10'
In an impassioned speech before the United Nations in 1967,
Dr. Arvid Pardo, the ambassador from Malta, proposed a revolutionary
regime, which galvanized support for the third UN Conference on the
Law of the Sea. 102 As a means to remedy the disparities between the
industrial and developing nations, Pardo advocated for the use of sea-
bed mineral resources as "the common heritage of mankind," and not
subject to exploitation by any State for its sole use. 10 3
Propelled by these lofty ideals, the General Assembly set about
to create a new international economic order ("NIEO") based on the
common heritage doctrine. 10 4 For developing States, this new eco-
nomic order was a cardinal concern. There was a fear that adhering to
the piecemeal status quo of maritime law based on the traditional free-
dom of the seas and notions of bilateral reciprocity would result in the
use of the sea such that "'few countries benefitted ... while the rest
lived in poverty, as had been done with the riches of the land.""0 5 The
"technological under-development [of the developing world] meant
that established maritime States could profit tremendously" while
non-industrialized countries would struggle to compete. '0 6 Eventually
Ambassador Pardo prevailed, and the language of his speech was
adapted into a UN General Assembly resolution, °7 codified in Part XI,
98 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 12.
99 Holmes, supra note 6, at 330.
100 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 19-20.
101 See Anand, supra note 40, at 275.
102 See Ambassador Arvid Pardo, Address at the 22nd Session of the General As-
sembly of the United Nations (Nov. 1, 1967).
103 See O'CONNELL, supra note 38, at 459-60.
104 See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
G.A. Res. 3201, at 3, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967).
105 Anand, supra note 40, at 275 (quoting Venezuelan President Carlos Andr~s
Perez).
106 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 12.
107 See G.A. Res. 2749, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
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Article 136 of UNCLOS, which classified the deep seabed as part of the
common heritage of mankind.'1 8
However, as codified under the Convention, resources belong-
ing to "the common heritage of mankind" eventually gained a more
nuanced meaning.' 0 9 Specifically, no State may exercise exclusive
sovereignty over any part of the Area or its resources, no part of the
Area may be appropriated by any natural or juridical person, and fi-
nally, the mining of resources within the Area may only be carried out
under the procedures pursuant to Part XI and the Seabed Authority,
which will act on behalf of State parties to UNCLOS."
1. The Part XI Mining Regime and the 1994 Implementing
Agreement
Part XI of UNCLOS addresses the deep seabed mining regime
for areas beyond national jurisdictions and established the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority ("ISA") to administer and regulate the natural
resources of the Area on behalf of all nations. 1 ' The ISA established
three principal organs: the Council, the executive organ; the Assembly,
a fully-representative policy-making body; and the Secretariat, which
fulfills the administrative functions of the ISA." 2 Also consequential
was the creation of the Enterprise, a significant entity charged with
carrying out the mining activities of the Area meant essentially to
serve as the operating arm of the ISA, subject to the control of the
Council. 11 3
The original provisions of the UNCLOS mining administration
were objectionable for a multitude of reasons, but all were seen as uni-
108 UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 136.
109 There is a certain amount of irony in the application of the common heritage of
mankind doctrine under UNCLOS. The common heritage axiom is strongly remi-
niscent of Hugo Grotius' notion of the freedom of the seas, and it did indeed estab-
lish a new, more egalitarian economic order. However, it did not necessarily
reflect the freedom of the seas, given its high level of regulation. The structure
and procedure of the ISA threatened the private market interests of industrialized
nations by attempting to compensate for economic with rules that were designed
to be disadvantageous to certain countries. Whereas Grotius advanced his argu-
ment based on the inability of any nation to seize or own the ocean, Pardo's ratio-
nale is directed at seabed minerals-resources known precisely in terms of
possession.
110 Jason Warren Howard, Note, Don't Be Left Out in the Cold: An Argument for
Advancing American Interests in the Arctic Outside the Ambits of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea, 42 GA. L. REV. 833, 845 n.81 (2008).
111 UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 156.
112 Id. art. 158.
113 See KLEIN, supra note 29, at 324.
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formly antithetical to capitalism and free market principles.1 14 As
originally proposed, this regime "required mandatory transfers of tech-
nology, employed an economic model that preempted free-market en-
terprise, failed to assure access to future deep seabed resources, and
included a voting structure that gave all nations equal control regard-
less of their technological capabilities or contributions."'1 5 The Seabed
Authority also reserved the power to conduct its own activities through
the Enterprise as a parallel mining company, essentially allowing the
ISA to claim mining rights equal to the combined total of "all compet-
ing private consortia and State-sponsored mining concerns authorized
to operate in the Area."" 16
The result was a commingling of private and public mining sys-
tems that was not well received. The amount of control afforded each
of these bodies, primarily the Enterprise, proved a highly controversial
issue. Indeed, even Ambassador Pardo did not envision a large role
and such wide discretion for the Seabed Authority." 7 At the time,
such an economic order was entirely unprecedented, and the reaction
among industrialized nations was fairly predictable.
While the number of ratifications increased throughout the
1980s, there was a discernible lack of participation by the industrial-
ized countries."' The United States, for one, was unwilling to com-
promise its vital interests "for the sake of world opinion" or
participation in what it considered an experimental, protectionist re-
gime with an institutional bias weighted disproportionately in favor of
the developing world." 9 America viewed the regime as contrary to
ideals of liberty, private property, and free enterprise, but many other
countries harbored similar concerns. In response to the general reluc-
tance of industrialized countries, the UN Secretary General sought to
entice the developed world to adopt the Convention by redressing
these and other concerns with an Implementing Agreement.' 2 °
Specifically, the Agreement streamlined the procedure for ap-
proving commercial mining applications, and the thorny issue of the
role of the Enterprise was discarded entirely, save for the situation in
114 Id. at 321.
115 Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the
Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 23, 34-35 (2005).
116 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 326.
117 Id. at 347.
118 Id. at 321.
119 Id. at 321 n.19 (quoting James L. Malone, The United States and the Law of
the Sea, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 785, 785-86 (1984)).
120 See Bernard H. Oxman, Law of the Sea Forum: The 1994 Agreement on Imple-
mentation of the Seabed Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, in LAw
OF THE SEA, supra note 40, at 343, 343.
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which market demand warrants its functioning. 12 1 The regulatory
discretion of the Seabed Authority itself was significantly curtailed 122
by obliging compliance with the requirements of private miners 123 and
reinterpreting production restrictions based on market-oriented GATT
requirements. 124
The Agreement also relaxed the financial obligations on pri-
vate mining applicants. 125 While payments to the Seabed Authority
are still required after five years of production, they are minimal and
eventually capped at 7% of production, and royalties must be paid only
if production in the offshore Area is successful. 126 Finally, the forced
transfer of technology was specifically eliminated, and although an ad-
monition to facilitate the acquisition of seabed mining technology re-
mains, it is permissible only if conducted in a manner consistent with
respect for intellectual property rights. 27
Overall, the 1994 Agreement accomplished its purpose, over-
coming the original objections of developed nations and crafting incen-
tives rather than obligations. The distasteful principle of the common
heritage of mankind was retained, but its claws were removed. Fur-
ther, the changes made by the Agreement prevail over the original
Convention in the event of any inconsistency. 2 As a reflection of its
success, the Agreement was signed by over fifty countries within the
first year, including the U.S.' 29
III. PROBLEMS ARISING UNDER UNCLOS AND THE
IMPLICATIONS ON ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY
A myriad of problems are likely to surface in the Arctic context
under the Convention. As substantial, untouched resources become
available for the first time in a new frontier, worldwide energy scarci-
ties are unlikely to lead to a communal sharing of resources. States
are more determined to secure resources for their own populations in-
stead, 30 which is likely to incite a "petroleum rush"' 3 ' and arouse old
121 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 326.
122 Id. at 326-27.
123 Holmes, supra note 6, at 336.
124 Oxman, supra note 120, at 347.
125 See id. at 350; see also Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Aug.
17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1309 (1994) [hereinafter Implementation Agreement].
126 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the S. Foreign Rela-
tions Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (written testimony of John D. Negroponte, Dep-
uty Secretary of State).
127 Oxman, supra note 120, at 347.
128 See Implementation Agreement, supra note 125, at 1326.
129 Oxman, supra note 120, at 343.
130 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 347.
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tensions. UNCLOS effectively prohibits unsubstantiated expansion-
ism by a coastal State, but private or state-sponsored offshore resource
mining is unlikely to facilitate any collaboration. 132 In such an atmos-
phere, UNCLOS may prove insufficient to check the self-interest of
States and enforce proper distribution of resources for the benefit of
all. Ultimately, however, these shortcomings are unlikely to pose an
insurmountable obstacle to the successful operation of the Convention
as a whole.
A. Classification of Arctic Resources
Part XI of UNCLOS precludes exclusive control of "all solid,
liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath
the seabed, including polymetallic nodules"' 33 beyond 200 nautical
miles. Since resources in the Arctic fall precisely in this category, for
the time being the Arctic must be used for the benefit of all, and not
simply in the economic interests of the superpowers who may be best
able to harvest its resources.13 4
Any State seeking to mine in the Arctic therefore would be re-
quired to adhere to the procedures established by the Authority.' 35 At
a minimum, these would entail abiding by the financial requirements
as well as mapping "a single continuous area," and dividing it into two
separate areas of equal commercial value, and submitting all data ob-
tained with respect to these areas.'3 6 To circumvent these require-
ments, the objective of the Arctic States has become removing polar
resources from under the jurisdiction of the Seabed Authority entirely
by claiming a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.
B. The Juridical Continental Shelf
Since the extent of a State's continental shelf essentially will
determine the extent of its sovereign rights over the seabed, one would
assume that UNCLOS provides conclusive legal guidelines. Thus,
within the context of global warming and the changing climate in the
Arctic, the vagaries of continental shelf boundaries are fraught with
the most potential for conflict.
In delimiting the continental shelf under UNCLOS, signatory
States must derive sovereign rights outside the EEZ by presenting evi-
131 Krauss et al., supra note 2.
132 Unless, of course, a common problem arises, or another sovereign interest
apart from resource recovery, such as environmental integrity, is threatened. See
HOLLICK, supra note 15, at 17.
133 UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 133.
134 Anand, supra note 40, at 275.
135 See KLEIN, supra note 29, at 324.
136 See id. at 326.
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dence that their territorial shelf is connected to the seabed, up to a
maximum of 350 nautical miles.1 37 Therefore, in order to assert do-
mestic jurisdiction in what would otherwise be part of the Area, a
State must base its claim on an extension of its territorial jurisdiction
based on the extent to which their continental shelf reaches into the
Arctic. Yet determining the extent of a broad shelf, based on the "nat-
ural prolongation" of land territory, is hindered by the Convention's
inherently ambiguous and subjective language.
UNCLOS employs a juridical understanding of the continental
shelf' 3 . based on an extension of a coastal State's continental land
mass, but without much concern for the mot juste. Consequently, this
definition is far from straightforward. The term "continental shelf' as-
sumed several variegated and political meanings during UNCLOS ne-
gotiations, 139 eventually coming to refer to the extent of the relatively
shallow underwater sea floor a State sought to control.
140
As the terms mentioned above are the product of protracted ne-
gotiations and refinements, they depend on such a nuanced conception
of the continental shelf. With a definition of the shelf that essentially
consists of "science ... applied within a legal framework,"' 4 ' this per-
haps was inevitable. While the Convention's continental shelf regime
obviously cannot be implemented without scientific and technical ex-
pertise, 142 the development of ocean sciences played an ancillary role
in its political and legal rendering. "4  In fact, the final text of Article
76 contains some concepts which "are stripped of their purely scientific
meaning in order to maximize the legal concept[s]." 14 4 The conclusion
137 Stuhltrager, supra note 11, at 40.
138 See CLCS, supra note 75.
139 See SUAREZ, supra note 30, at 74 (arguing that "the definition, composition and
outer limits of the continental shelf' are products of long-standing negotiations
and an incomplete reliance on science). "For example, the fundamental principle
upon which the juridical continental shelf is based asserts that the continental
shelf belongs to the coastal state and not to the bigger land mass or continent as a
whole." Id.; cf. O'CONNELL, supra note 38, at 488-498 (stating that the question of
legal limits of the continental shelf arose as a part of the definition of the doctrine
itself, the inevitable result of which was the search for a pragmatic limit on the
extent of rights within the context of a definition that did not treat legal and geo-
graphical concepts of the continental shelf equally); Prows, supra note 1, at
279-80.
140 See generally SUAREZ, supra note 30, at 39-74 (detailing the evolution of the
continental shelf during the UNCLOS sessions and various State submissions re-
garding its legal meaning).
141 CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS: THE SCIENTIFIC AND LEGAL INTERFACE 12 (Peter J.
Cook & Chris M. Carleton eds., 2000) [hereinafter CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS].
142 SUAREZ, supra note 30, at 132.
'43 See id. at 74.
144 Id.
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reached was that "the continental shelf, although originally a physical
concept, is principally a legal or artificial concept that developed to
suit the purpose of the states."145
To the point, Article 76 of UNCLOS defines the continental
shelf using externally-imposed legal criteria mixed with imprecise sci-
entific terms to justify the rights conferred.' 46 Such conflation of sci-
entific terms with political meanings is inherently problematic.
Indeed, such a legal theory that purports to regulate behavior over
tangible resources cannot ignore the boundaries of the scientific terms
it employs. The practice of implementing hypothetical concepts "with-
out taking into account the scientific facts that constitute reality" can
only lead to contradiction. 47 Nevertheless, the outer limits of the con-
tinental shelf "do not necessarily lie on the outer edge of the continen-
tal margin . . . [but rather] where the application of the rules and
formulae under Article 76 places them." 4 s
C. The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
The CLCS is the entity that inevitably must deal with the un-
wieldy juridical continental shelf. It is a body established under An-
nex II of the Convention consisting of twenty-one experts empowered
to make recommendations regarding the continental shelf and help re-
solve disputes.149 In order to extend the outer limit of its continental
shelf beyond the 200-nautical mile maximum, a coastal State must
substantiate its claim with scientific data and make a formal submis-
sion to the CLCS."'5 Thus, the outer limit of a State's continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is not fixed under UNCLOS until a
claim is researched, submitted to the CLCS, approved, and then offi-
cially promulgated by that State. This process of delimitation is
summed up as "submission preparation, CLCS review, and delineation
deposit."''
Yet here again, reality complicates what is essentially a
straightforward process. In practical terms, the entire continental
145 Id. at 241.
146 There are two methods that may be used to determine the extent of the conti-
nental shelf, but both require the drawing of a line using fixed points that are
based on either (i) the thickness of sedimentary rocks in relation to the foot of the
continental slope, or (ii) fixed points that are no more than sixty nautical miles
from the foot of the continental slope. The foot of the continental slope "shall be
determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base" but only
absence "evidence to the contrary." UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 76(4).
147 O'CONNELL, supra note 38, at 440.
148 SUAREZ, supra note 30, at 241.
149 UNCLOS, supra note 55, annex II, art. 2(2).
"50 Id. annex II, art. 4.
151 Prows, supra note 1, at 273.
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margin varies considerably from one coastal area to another. 152 For
example, the margin "along the west coast of South America drops
away very steeply," but in other places it extends "gradually outward
to distances of over 500 miles before meeting the deep ocean floor."'15 3
The continental shelf of countries with a particularly broad continen-
tal margin, such as Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the
United States, and Russia, is therefore negotiable under the criteria of
the Convention.15 4
However, the CLCS does not instill confidence that continental
shelf claims can be submitted or approved with predictability and uni-
formity. The Commission has not yet ruled affirmatively on any conti-
nental shelf proposal and suffers from a lack of transparency, 155 so the
criteria it considers probative is not yet known. Nor does the CLCS
have the authority to settle continental shelf disputes. 15 6 The power of
CLCS is advisory only, and its recommendations are binding only if
they are incorporated into a member State's official submission. 157
Further, the submission process is conceivably infinite, and does not
promote reliability. If the CLCS finds the claim unsubstantiated, it
can reject it, but the State may make as many subsequent submissions
as it desires within a given time frame.'15
Some have argued that this formulation affords disproportion-
ate weight to a State's individual interpretation of geologic and scien-
tific data, which defies the imposition of any true outer limit,
especially when claims overlap. 159 For example, the technical terms
used by Article 76 to define the continental shelf are based on impre-
cise scientific concepts and naturally subject to interpretation. One
method of determining the outer limit of the shelf is to draw a line no
more than sixty nautical miles from the foot of the continental
slope.' 6 ° Ideally speaking, the foot of the continental slope is deter-
mined at the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base.' 6 '
However, it is unknown where the CLCS will posit the point of maxi-
mum change, where the base itself is, or even how it will view support-
152 HOLLICK, supra note 15, at 7.
153 Id. at 7-8.
154 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 515 cmt. a (1987).
155 The Commission has completed evaluating the submissions of only two coun-
tries: Russia and Brazil. While several recommendations were revealed, the
CLCS has yet to publish any legally binding ruling. See SUAREZ, supra note 30, at
2-3.
156 Prows, supra note 1, at 275.
157 See UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 76(8); annex II, art. 3(1).
158 Prows, supra note 1, at 274.
159 See ODA, supra note 70, at 618-619.
160 UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 76(4)(a)(ii).
161 See Prows, supra note 1, at 280.
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ing data. Nor has any international tribunal has been willing to
establish universal guideposts, preferring to judge each continental
shelf case on its own merits with regard to its peculiar circum-
stances. 162 The result is that, in the absence of precedent, such issues
are dependent on State interpretation.
Analogously, the continental shelf drop-off to the deep seabed
may be alternately a gradual, sloping extension of the landmass, or a
connection to "long-submerged ridges."163 It is a subject of debate
when, if ever, these ridges may be considered a permissible part of the
continental shelf. In defining the continental shelf, UNCLOS explic-
itly excludes "the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil
thereof' from comprising part of a shelf.164 However, certain ridges,
which developed separately to continental margins, may come to at-
tach to them through accretion as a result of tectonic movement. 165
In this latter category, the ridges "might add thousands of
square miles to a country's exploitable seabed" if properly mapped. 166
Thus a coastal State's conception of an "oceanic ridge" is an essential
element of any prospective continental shelf claim. Yet science does
little to clarify the Convention's political terminology. Indeed, the sci-
entific conceptions of accreted oceanic ridges themselves fail to yield
uniformity. 16 "According to some scientists, accreted margins are not
[the proscribed] oceanic ridges of the deep ocean floor."'16  Others
maintain that, while they emanate from the ocean floor, they may nev-
ertheless be treated as a component of the shelf for the purposes of
Article 76.169 Finally, other experts insist that the Convention's prin-
ciple of "submerged prolongation of the land mass does not apply in
the case of accreted ridges."' 7 °
While outright manipulation of scientific data is unlikely, a
State's construing certain geologic findings favorable to the Conven-
tion's definition of the continental shelf is all but assured. The crucial
162 See Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 92 (Feb. 24) (guarding
explicitly against the over-conceptualizing the application of the principles relat-
ing to the continental shelf).
163 Krauss et al., supra note 2.
164 UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 76(3).
165 SUAREZ, supra note 30, at 165.
166 Krauss et al., supra note 2.
167 SUAREZ, supra note 30, at 168 (discussing Russia's inclusion of ridges in its
original 2001 continental shelf submission and the lack of public knowledge re-
garding the CLCS's treatment of ridges).
168 Id. at 165.
169 This theory is grounded in the formation and physical presence of the ridges,
rather than their origin. Since accretion is a "natural process of forming margins"
they should not be considered distinct from them. Id. at 166.
170 id.
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power to determine not only the evaluation process, but also the valid-
ity of scientific data, seems ill placed in the hands of an advisory com-
mittee. Thus, while Article 76 of the Convention establishes a useful
framework for the Arctic, it fails to specify the exact nature of the sci-
entific evidence necessary to identify continental shelf boundaries
conclusively.
D. Lack of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for Conflicting
Boundaries
Also troublesome for the Arctic is the inability of UNCLOS to
adjudicate conclusively any potentially conflicting claims of sover-
eignty based on an extended continental shelf. Part XV imposes an
overarching obligation on all States to first attempt to settle disputes
by peaceful means.17 1 For disputes that cannot be settled amicably,
UNCLOS provides only a limited compulsory dispute resolution mech-
anism for most potential conflicts, allowing a State to select one of four
alternatives.1 7 2 Each procedure is relatively straightforward, but
their interaction is complex, and success depends greatly upon
whether or not opposing States have agreed to be bound by the same
measures. However, notwithstanding these inchoate responsibilities,
territorial issues "are neither completely nor comprehensively regu-
lated by the Convention,"' 7 3 and it is unlikely that disputes arising
from claims of Arctic sovereignty based on continental shelf extensions
will be addressed adequately by UNCLOS.
The weakness of the Convention's binding methods of dispute
resolution has even been observed by a tribunal constituted under UN-
CLOS. 1'7 4 To the point, Section 2 of UNCLOS fleshes out the compul-
sory dispute resolution process,17 5 but Article 297 specifically omits
from the compulsory binding procedure precisely the type of jurisdic-
tional disputes likely to arise in the Arctic. 176 Only the freedoms and
rights pertaining to navigation, overflight, submarine cables, and cer-
171 UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 279.
172 Part XV of the Convention (Articles 279-299) requires all disputes to be settled
by peaceful means, but in the event that no settlement is reached, the dispute
must be submitted to a tribunal with appropriate jurisdiction. Article 287 limits
the acceptable judicial bodies to: (a) The International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea (established under Annex VI of UNCLOS); (b) The ICJ; (c) an arbitral tribunal
constituted pursuant to Annex VII of the Convention; or (d) a special arbitral tri-
bunal for certain categories of disputes under Annex VIII. See id. art. 287.
173 See KLEIN, supra note 29, at 22.
174 See Southern Bluefin Tuna (Austl. v. Japan), 39 I.L.M 1359, 1390 (noting that
it appears that "UNCLOS falls significantly short of establishing a truly compre-
hensive regime of compulsory jurisdiction entailing binding decisions.").
175 UNCLOS, supra note 55, arts. 286-296.
176 Id. art. 297.
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tain other internationally lawful uses are specifically subject to com-
pulsory dispute settlement.'7 7 Any dispute involving jurisdiction in
extended maritime zones, e.g. overlapping continental shelf claims, is
explicitly exempted from compulsory resolution at the option of the
Member State. 178
1. Territorial Disputes
In the likely event of conflicting territorial claims between
States with opposite or adjacent coasts, as is the case in the Arctic,
"delimitation is to be effected by agreement."x7 9 Interim boundary
agreements are encouraged, but no precise method is prescribed to
reach such an agreement. 8 0 States may invoke "the panoply of inter-
national law articulated in treaties, customary, and general interna-
tional law, and as recognized in arbitral and judicial decision" to reach
an equitable resolution.18 ' Yet should these fail, there is no
mandatory procedure to solve conflicts over the limits of the continen-
tal shelf.
Articles 74 and 83 discuss the continental shelf and the EEZ
respectively, but do not address cases where natural resources overlap
between the two areas.' 8 2 Instead, agreements are to be reached "in
accordance with international law in order to achieve an equitable so-
lution."18 3 Further, Article 298 allows for a State to opt-out of even the
potential to have a jurisdictional dispute resolved under the Conven-
tion.' Therefore, a State may eliminate even the possibility of volun-
tary compliance by indicating "in writing that it does not accept any
one or more of the procedures" available under the compulsory dispute
resolution mechanism for these disputes.'8 5 All of the Arctic nations,
save for Norway, have done so, indicating that they would not accept
any of the procedures if conflicting claims of jurisdiction arose in the
Arctic. 186
The logical inference is obvious that boundary disputes involv-
ing the territorial sea, EEZ, continental shelf, and inland waters were
177 See KLEIN, supra note 29, at 141.
178 See UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 298(1)(a)(i).
179 id.
180 See KLEIN, supra note 29, at 278.
181 Id.
182 See ODA, supra note 70, at 618-19.
183 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 244.
184 UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 298(1) (allowing a State to waive the applicabil-
ity of dispute resolution to various maritime boundary conflicts at any time upon
ratifying UNCLOS).
185 Id.
186 Holmes, supra note 6, at 325.
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intentionally excluded from binding dispute resolution.' 8 7 Rather,
UNCLOS first defers to a State's preferred method of dispute resolu-
tion and next gives primacy to any existing external bilateral agree-
ments."' The only obligation imposed is to exchange views regarding
a settlement or its implementation,1 9 and the ability to "invite" oppos-
ing parties to submit a feeble process of conciliation.' 9 ° As an uneasy
compromise between the common heritage requirements of Part XI
and national interests, the requirements for delimiting the continental
shelf leaves "room to doubt whether there is any legal rule at all."''
2. The Common Heritage Principle: A Contradiction in Dispute
Resolution
Finally, the nature of Arctic geography and the close proximity
of all five Arctic Nations predispose the region to conflicting continen-
tal shelf claims. However, the exceptions to the "mandatory system in
UNCLOS may demonstrate that the system in Part XV is unlikely to
function well, if at all."' 9 2
Despite the Convention's requirement that the delimitation of
the continental shelf between such neighboring States be conducted in
accordance with existing international law, its approach is remarkably
passive. 19 3 For example, Annex VI of UNCLOS established the Inter-
national Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS") with jurisdiction to
pass upon all maritime disputes that relate to the use of the oceans. 1 4
However, submission of a dispute to ITLOS is entirely voluntary and it
exists only as one of four fora competent to hear disputes arising under
the Convention.1 5
187 Cf UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 298(1).
188 Id. arts. 280, 281(1) (addressing alternate methods resolution prior to the Con-
vention's own procedures at the beginning of the "Settlement of Disputes" section).
189 Id. art. 283.
190 Id. art. 284.
191 See KLEIN, supra note 29, at 245.
192 Id. at 26.
193 Article 83 provides for the delimitation of the continental shelf in cases of po-
tential overlap between countries that have opposite or adjacent coasts, but its
rhetorical standards are mostly broad recapitulations of the Convention's general
prerogatives to act in conformity with international law, in an equitable manner,
and within a reasonable time frame. Further, it confines its scope to the actual
extent of territory that affords sovereign rights and does not address the question
of resources that might lie on or beneath the shelf that might also be shared. See
UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 83.
194 Id. annex VI, art. 21.
195 Id. art. 287(a).
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Further, the Seabed Disputes Chamber,' 9 6 an ancillary cham-
ber under ITLOS, provides compulsory legal recourse only for disputes
involving the interpretation or application of the mining regime it-
self.'9 7 Essentially, the jurisdiction of the tribunal is confined to
claims regarding the application of rules and contractual obliga-
tions, 198 rather than the underlying claims of sovereignty. Thus even
ITLOS, the only international tribunal with maritime-specific jurisdic-
tion, does not have the authority to issue binding decisions regarding
claims of extended maritime jurisdiction.
The contradiction that this arrangement presents cannot be
avoided. First of all, the ability of a State to claim any modicum of
sovereignty outside 200 nautical miles appears to operate in deroga-
tion from the traditional law of the sea. 199 Nevertheless, Article 76
does permit coastal States to circumvent the common heritage princi-
ple by proving an extended continental shelf. If the outer limits of na-
tional jurisdictions imposed by UNCLOS are not absolute, it hardly
seems logical to rely on the Convention to settle disputes. Even more
perplexing, the extent to which the common heritage principle applies
cannot be settled by the Convention's own procedures.
The absence of true legal constraint will inevitably complicate
the drawing of extended maritime boundaries in the Arctic.200 Indeed,
any dispute over the boundaries of a continental shelf claim in the Arc-
tic would be subject to compulsory dispute resolution only by specific
agreement between the parties. 20 1 By sacrificing certainty to preserve
a vestigial element of the freedom of the seas in extended maritime
zones, UNCLOS has made itself vulnerable to the subjective expres-
sion of a State's cartographic designs.
IV. UNCLOS, GLOBAL WARMING, AND ARCTIC RESOURCES
A. Global Climate Change
The issue of global warming, or the more politically correct
term, "global climate change," has risen to the forefront of interna-
tional consciousness, especially in the past two decades.20 2 The Arctic
196 The Convention created the Seabed Disputes Chamber under the authority of
ITLOS to adjudicate disputes between States Parties concerning mining proce-
dures in the Area. Id. arts. 186-187.
197 Prows, supra note 1, at 289; UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 187(a).
198 UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 189.
199 O'CONNELL, supra note 38, at 73.
200 See KLEIN, supra note 29, at 245.
201 UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 299(1).
202 In a report to President Carter in 1979, the National Research Council of the
National Academy of Sciences concluded that "if carbon dioxide continues to in-
crease . . . [there is] no reason to doubt that climate changes will result" with
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environment in particular is witnessing changes unprecedented in
modern times. While scientists may disagree as to the "cause and per-
manence of the rapid polar melt," there is a general consensus that the"new Arctic will likely have less permanent ice.., resulting in ice-free
summers within a century."2 °3
The environmental implications of global warming are irrefut-
ably dire. However, a fundamental change in the dejure international
legal order of the sea is also inevitable. The cumulative, long-term ef-
fect of the impending climate change will destabilize existing stan-
dards and methodology in many other fields. Accordingly, the ambit of
State interests affected by global warming is also comprehensive.
As new strategic military areas change, national security con-
cerns arise. 20 4 Crop reductions caused by global warming may cause
mass migrations and other humanitarian and socio-political conse-
quences.2 °5 The loss of glaciers will also aggravate already severe
problems concerning access to potable water, 2°6 and international fish-
eries markets will be further depleted. 2 7 Driven by the retreating ice,
pink salmon are colonizing Arctic tributaries, cod are traveling north-
ward, and large-scale commercial fisheries are becoming increasingly
substantial implications for the future. Katie Simpson, Comment, Massachusetts
v. EPA: Supreme Court Ruling Spurns Green Investment, 14 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L.
189, 193 (2007) (quoting CLIMATE RESEARCH BOARD, CARBON DIOXIDE AND CLI-
MATE: A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, vii (1979)). Preliminary congressional action
followed in the form of the Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, finding that
manmade pollution "may be producing long-term and substantial increase in the
average temperature on Earth" and recognizing the international character of the
issue. National Climate Program, 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006). More recently, the Su-
preme Court rejected an assertion by the Environmental Protection Agency that
greenhouse gasses were not within its purview to regulate under the Clean Air
Act. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 542 (2007).
203 Mark Jarashow et al., Note, UNCLOS and the Arctic: the Path of Least Resis-
tance, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1587, 1587 (2007).
204 See Stuhltrager, supra note 11, at 36 (explaining that "global climate change
represents considerable uncertainty and risk" for the military). See generally CNA
CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), available
at http://www.securityandclimate.cna.org (examining the effects of climate change
on national security).
205 See generally Erica J. Thorson, On Thin Ice: The Failure of the United States
and the World Heritage Committee to Take Climate Change Mitigation Pursuant to
the World Heritage Convention Seriously, 38 ENVT'L L., Winter 2008, at 139,
142-43 (2008) (describing the effect global warming and melting glaciers in partic-
ular have on nearby ecosystems).
206 Stuhltrager, supra note 11, at 37-38.
207 Ken Alex, A Period of Consequences: Global Warming as Public Nuisance, 43
STAN. J. INT'L L. 77, 80 n.15 (2007).
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viable in the Arctic,2"' all in regions historically untouched.2 °9 In
terms of navigation, a prolonged shipping season would create new
shortcuts and yield increased traffic. Canada and America again are
disputing navigation rights in the Northwest Passage and the
Beaufort Sea as maritime traffic continues to increase.210 The lesser-
known Northeast Passage, which links Europe with China, is also cur-
rently the focus of a dispute between Russia and Norway.
The remainder this Comment will examine the legal implica-
tions of global warming on the newly-navigable waters of the Arctic
and the concomitant access to natural resources. As supplies of natu-
ral resources and livestock continue to diminish in traditional areas,
new access points in the Arctic and developing technologies provide an
opportunity to the Arctic Nations to harvest untapped resources and
support the dwindling domestic supply.
B. Prospective Claims to the Arctic
Recently, there has been a flurry of activity and international
developments in the Arctic, as various countries attempt to stake a
claim to the region in order to reap the benefits of widening access to
Arctic resources. Every Arctic State has at least kicked the tires on its
potential claim under UNCLOS.
In 2001, Russia staked a claim of sovereignty to virtually half
the Arctic based on a proclamation once made by Joseph Stalin,211
when he simply "drew a line from the northern Russian port of Mur-
mansk to the North Pole and declared it to be the Soviet Union's polar
territory."2 12 Despite the unilateral origin, the Russian claim to Arctic
territory turned on an assertion that Russia's continental shelf was
connected to the Arctic by a submarine mountain range called the
Lomonosov Ridge. 21 '3 The Lomonosov Ridge, cutting across 1200 miles
of the Arctic basin, is itself a source of an estimated 10 billion tons of
gas and oil deposits, as well as significant stores of diamonds, gold, tin,
and platinum.21 '4 However, when the CLCS 215 rejected this assertion,
208 See Alex Duval-Smith, Arctic Booms As Climate Change Melts Polar Ice Caps:
The Global Hunger for Oil is Fueling a New Gold Rush, OBSERVER (U.K), Nov. 27,
2005, at 21, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/1127-03.htm.
209 Krauss et al., supra note 2.
210 King, supra note 8, at 331.
211 Id.
212 See Reynolds, supra note 17.
213 Stuhltrager, supra note 11, at 39.
214 Putin's Arctic Invasion: Russia Lays Claim to the North Pole - And All Its Gas,
Oil, and Diamonds, DAILY MAIL (London), June 2007, available at http://www.
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-46492 1/Putins-Arctic-invasion-Russia-lays-claim-
North-Pole-gas-oil-diamonds.html [hereinafter Putin's Arctic Invasion].
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Russia began compiling more evidence to corroborate its continental
shelf proposal, which is scheduled to be resubmitted in 2009.216
Efforts were redoubled in 2007, when a nuclear-powered ice-
breaker was dispatched into the Arctic, along with a research ship and
two deep sea submarines, in order to collect samples of the Arctic sea-
bed. Russia hopes that this mission will yield data that prove that the
Lomonosov Ridge is a continuation of Russia's Siberian continental
shelf, based on geologic composition.21 7 The expedition also notori-
ously planted a Russian flag encased in titanium on the Lomonosov
Ridge, purportedly in support of the 2001 claim. 218 Not only was this
considered the first submarine mission to the deep seabed in the North
Pole, 2 " but it revealed Russia's Arctic designs to the international
community in a very overt manner. Indeed, the "new addition"
claimed by Russia includes the pole itself, spanning 1.2 million square
kilometers22°-an area five times the size of Britain-and containing
twice the amount of oil as Saudi Arabia.2 2 '
The other Arctic Nations wasted little time responding. Within
a month, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper toured the Arctic
and recommitted to the expansion of Canada's military presence in the
122region. 2 Specifically, Canada intends to build a new fleet of naval
vessels to patrol the Northwest Passage and open an Arctic deepwater
port.2 2 3 Harper also announced plans to expand the Canadian Rang-
ers patrol (an armed Inuit volunteer force) by 900 members and to con-
215 As discussed above in Section III(C), the CLCS is the only entity able to ana-
lyze and assist in establishing claims under the Convention. The CLCS cannot
issue any binding proclamations, but it may veto a State's proposal if it determines
that it lacks the necessary scientific support mandated by Article 76. The Com-
mission rejected the claim made by Russia in 2001, admonishing it to "reconsider
and resubmit its claim" which resulted in the current submission. Howard, supra
note 110, at 851.
216 Id. at 839; American Geological Institute, Cold Wars: Russia Claims Arctic
Land, GEOTIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, available at http://www.geotimes.org/aug07/article.
html?id=WebExtra080107.html [hereinafter Cold Wars].
217 Stuhltrager, supra note 11, at 39.
218 Id. at 40.
219 Holmes, supra note 6, at 323.
220 Jacqulyn Coston, Recent Development, What Lies Beneath: The CLCS and the
Race to Lay Claim Over the Arctic Seabed, 3 ENVr'L & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 149,
149 (2008).
221 Putin's Arctic Invasion, supra note 214.
222 Holmes, supra note 6, at 324.
223 Stuhltrager, supra note 11, at 39.
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struct several military training facilities in order to preserve its
continuing presence in the Arctic.2 24
More recently, the Canadian government has commissioned
the construction of two robotic submarines, set to be launched in 2010
in order to map the Canadian "gateway to the open Arctic Ocean. "225
The purpose of the mission, virtually identical to the Russian expedi-
tion, is to gather evidence that would link Canada's northern coastline
with the Alpha and Lomonosov Ridges.2 2 6
Norway, although an Arctic Nation, has previously admitted
that it did not possess a continental shelf sufficient to base a claim of
sovereignty in the Arctic. 227 Nevertheless, it too filed a legal claim in
2006 to extend its continental shelf into the Arctic Ocean pursuant to
UNCLOS Article 76.221 While Norway's submission does address the
limits of its continental shelf, it is primarily concerned with sover-
eignty over a shallow basin in the Barents Sea, an oil field that is re-
ported to hold more than twice all of Canada's gas reserves.2 29 Russia
has staked an overlapping claim to the basin,2 3 ° which lies 350 miles
north of Russian territory in the Arctic. Perhaps in an effort of good
faith, Norway has continued negotiations with Russia regarding the
conflicting jurisdictional claims in the Barents and Norwegian Seas.2 3 '
Denmark also sent an expedition to the Arctic to collect evi-
dence attempting to bolster a claim to the North Pole itself, based on a
link between the Arctic continental shelf and that of Greenland, a
Danish province.23 2 Interestingly, the Danish bid is based on new geo-
logical data linking the North Pole and Greenland via the Lomonosov
Ridge,2 3 3 the same underwater mountain range upon which Russia
stakes its own claim.2 34 Further, the ridge also approaches Canadian
224 Tenille Bonoguore & Alexander Panetta, Canada Steps Up Fight for the Arctic,
GLOBE AND MAIL (Canada), Aug. 10, 2007, available at http://www.theglobeand
mail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070810.wharperO8lO/BNStory/National/home.
225 Randy Boswell, Robot Subs to Help Canada Probe Arctic Waters, CANWEST
NEWS, Nov. 7, 2008, available at http://www.canada.com/story.html?id=941539.
226 Id.
227 Holmes, supra note 6, at 324.
228 See id.; CONTINENTAL SHELF SUBMISSION OF NORWAY IN RESPECT OF THE ARCTIC
OCEAN, THE BARENTS SEA AND THE NORWEGIAN SEA, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, http://
www.un.orglDepts/los/clcs-new/submissionsfiles/norO6/norexec-sum.pdf.
229 Krauss et al., supra note 2.
230 Holmes, supra note 6, at 338.
231 Krauss et al., supra note 2.
232 Holmes, supra note 6, at 324.
233 Julian Coman, Denmark Causes International Chill by Claiming North Pole,
TELEGRAPH, Oct. 17, 2004, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world
news/1474377/Denmark-causes-international-chill-by-claiming-North-Pole.html.
234 See Howard, supra note 110, at 839.
2008]
226 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 8:2
territory via Ellesmere Island.2 3 5 Denmark hopes to make a formal
claim once the survey of the ridge is complete, but its own claim of
sovereignty is inherently weakened by the semiautonomous status of
Greenland, the only Danish territory geologically associated with the
Arctic.
The United States, for its part, has participated in seabed ex-
ploratory activities as well. While America did not respond with the
alacrity of other nations, the aging U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy was
dispatched to the Arctic in order "to map the sea floor on the northern
Chukchi Cap... to better understand its morphology and the potential
for including this area within the United States' extended continental
shelf under [UNCLOS]" according to the National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration.2 36 The U.S. also is considering building
two new polar icebreakers to supplement its minimal and outdated
Arctic fleet.2 3 7 The U.S. Navy has further concluded that the receding
ice levels in the Arctic will necessitate increased naval and air
operations.2 3 s
C. Rival Claims and Uncertainty in the Arctic
The behavior of the Arctic Nations has done little to foster pre-
dictability, especially as various States pursue disparate methods of
asserting sovereignty in the polar region. As discussed previously, the
United States has been slow to act due to its rejection of the Conven-
tion, Denmark has only just begun to examine its ability to claim an
extended continental shelf, and Russia and Norway are the only na-
tions to have submitted proposals to the CLCS in support of an exten-
sion based on Arctic seabed geology and composition. On the other
hand, Canada traditionally has based Arctic sovereignty on its contin-
ued presence in the Arctic 239 and has yet to submit a proposal on its
continental shelf to the CLCS. 24 0 Thus the Canadian assertion is com-
235 Coston, supra note 220, at 154 n.49.
236 Stuhltrager, supra note 11, at 40.
237 Holmes, supra note 6, at 323.
238 Stuhltrager, supra note 11, at 40.
239 For example, rising temperatures have made the Northwest Passage fully nav-
igable, prompting renewed claims that the waterway is a critical part of Canadian
history and territorial waters. See David Shukman, Ice Melt Raises Passage Ten-
sion, BBC NEWS, Oct. 8, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/na-
ture/7033498.stm.
240 This omission is not as illogical as it might seem, given that Canada first
claimed an interest in the North Pole in the 1950s, and most atlases place the Pole
within Canadian borders. See Coman, supra note 233.
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plicated by reliance on an "'amalgam of archipelagic, historic waters
and sector claims.' 2 4 1
Further, the responses of Arctic nations have been framed
more as nationalistic and emotional arguments, rather than legal
opinions. Despite the dubious legal authority of the Russian flag-
planting in 2007, the incident provoked a degree of international con-
sternation. True, a "19th Century imperial land grab '2 42 in the Arctic
is not a feasible outcome, since UNCLOS does provide a mechanism
for resolving disputes that can be relied on to a certain extent. How-
ever, the illegality of a land grab does little to dampen the excited
clamor of an Arctic "resource rush," poorly disguised by the other Arc-
tic States.
For example, Canada's Foreign Minister at the time objected to
the imperial nature of Russia's expedition. 4 3 Prime Minister Stephen
Harper also hopes that Canada's renewed commitment to the region
will bolster its long-term presence and strengthen the nation's sover-
eignty over the Arctic.2 44 A Danish scientist has stated that "'[t]he
Vikings hope to get [to the Arctic] first.' ' ' 245 The Russian scientist and
legislator Artur Chilingarov has avowed that "'[t]he Arctic is ours and
we should demonstrate our presence."' 2 4 6 There is good reason to ex-
pect that the frenetic scramble to establish Arctic sovereignty will only
gain momentum as the ice continues to recede, especially considering
"[t]he alacrity with which coastal states [first] 'implemented' the sover-
eign rights ... with respect to oil and gas, fisheries, and other natural
resources of the economic zone and continental shelf' when UNCLOS
entered into force.2 4 7
Matters are further complicated by political relations, as the
five coastal Arctic States are not the only nations with a foothold in the
Arctic, let alone with an interest in new sources of fuel. 24 8 Among the
241 Barry Hart Dubner, On the Basis for Creation of a New Method of Defining
International Jurisdiction in the Arctic Ocean, 13 Mo. ENVT'L L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 18
(2005) (quoting BRIAN D. SMITH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE ENVIRON-
MENT: THE RULES OF DECISION 223 (Ian Brownlie ed., Oxford University Press
1988)).242 Howard, supra note 110, at 851 (quoting Peter Croker, the United Nations
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf).
243 Id. at 838.
244 Bonoguore et al., supra note 224.
245 Coman, supra note 233.
246 See Russians to Dive Below the North Pole, BBC NEWS, July 24, 2007, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6914178.stm.
247 John R. Stevenson & Bernard Oxman, The Future of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 488, 496 (1994).
248 There are a total of eight countries with a presence in the Arctic, and even non-
Arctic countries have showed increasing interest in the region. China, for in-
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littoral States themselves, the position of the United States also adds
to the uncertainty. The U.S. already maintains a significant commer-
cial presence in the Arctic and fosters economic ties with other Arctic
Nations, which will be affected by the claims of other States vying for
sovereignty. For example, the U.S. currently imports mass amounts of
oil from Norway and would likely stand to gain if Norway established
a recognized claim to Arctic reserves.2 4 9 To this end, the U.S. ambas-
sador in Oslo, John Doyle Ong, inserted himself in the ongoing negoti-
ations between Russia and Norway over the Barents Sea in 2005.2"0
Yet this has not prevented America from collaborating with other Arc-
tic States, or from exploring the possibility of its own claim based on
the limits of Alaska's continental shelf.
The need for a functioning legal order capable of governing the
various competing claims of Arctic sovereignty is manifest. Despite
the Convention's deficiencies, it is an authoritative, internationally-
recognized regime with comprehensive maritime jurisdiction under
which legal claims to the Arctic may be advanced and disputed.
D. Legally Viable Claims to the Arctic Under UNCLOS and
Russia's Preeminence
Divining a cognizable claim out of the current state of affairs is
a difficult and unprecedented endeavor. As discussed above in Section
IV(B), the near universality of UNCLOS has caused most of the Arctic
States, at a minimum, to incorporate elements of its provisions. While
it remains unclear exactly how the putative claims to the Arctic will be
addressed, States appear to defer to the primacy of UNCLOS, at least
superficially.
Accordingly, in order to remove sections of the Arctic seabed
from the communal jurisdiction of the International Seabed Authority,
sovereign rights must be predicated on an extended continental shelf
claim, in accordance with the requirements of Article 76, and approved
by the CLCS.2 5 ' Since the CLCS has not recognized an outer limit of
any nation's continental shelf that would justify exclusive jurisdiction
within the Arctic, it is likely that the country with the most legally
stance, has taken note of the polar melt, setting up a research station on the Nor-
wegian island of Spitsbergen and sending an icebreaker into the Arctic to conduct
climate research. Krauss et al., supra note 2.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 See Prows, supra note 1, at 247 (citing Article 76 as the dispositive factor in
deciding Arctic claims since it operates as the "crucial nexus separating the extent
of coastal State jurisdiction over seabed natural resources from the 'common heri-
tage' beyond.").
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cognizable claim of sovereignty over Arctic resources is that which is
first able to prove such an extension.
If Russia's latest claim proves a connection between the
Lomonosov Ridge and Russian territory, it stands a good chance of be-
ing accepted, regardless of the status of other States' submissions
based on intersecting territory. While speculation only,252 this would
entail at least two elements: (1) proving that the Lomonosov Ridge
truly is a geological extension of the Siberian shelf, as opposed to
oceanic crust or part of a different continental margin entirely,253
based on the scientific data gathered, and (2) overcoming the deficien-
cies noted by the CLCS in the 2001 submission.254 Since the Russian
submission included "accreted ridges" in its continental shelf claim, it
bears the added difficulty of proving that its claim does not incorporate
any artificial formations that do not technically compose part of the
shelf.255
Although Russia's original 2001 bid was rejected and its cur-
rent proposal incorporates territory arguably belonging to other Arctic
States, its second submission should not be considered an empty act of
cartographic aggression. Rather, Russia must be considered the fron-
trunner in the Arctic race simply by virtue of its consistent and overt
positive steps under the Convention's provisions.
Notwithstanding the objections of other Arctic States or the
fact that the CLCS does not define with any reliable degree of particu-
larity the scientific evidence it would require, a deputy head of the In-
stitute of World Ocean Geology has stated that Russia has obtained
sufficient proof that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of its conti-
nental margin.256 In anticipation of its claim, Russia has expanded its
fleet of oceangoing icebreakers to around fourteen, including the
252 Not only is CLCS evaluation a highly technical and involved process, but it
also suffers from a lack of oversight based on confidentiality concerns. Given the
nature of the Commission and the fact that only a handful of countries have made
submissions, none in its final and binding form, predicting the outcome of conti-
nental shelf proposals is simply an exercise in guesswork. See id. at 275-76.
253 See Cold Wars, supra note 216. This is fundamentally a "matter of definition"
in light of other States' overlapping claims and the complicated nature of the ridge
itself. Fifty million years ago, "the ridge was ripped away from the outer part of
the continental margin of Eurasia ... and a new ocean basin formed between the
ridge and the shelf." Not only is the Russian basin younger than the basin on the
Alaskan side, but it also shows evidence of faulting and rifting, indications that it
may not be geologically connected to the Siberian shelf. Id.
254 For the few CLCS recommendations that were made public, see SUAREZ, supra
note 30, at 3, 203-204.
255 See supra text accompanying note 169; SUAREZ, supra note 30, at 168.
256 Howard, supra note 110, at 839 (citing Nikolaus von Twickel, Soil Sample
Backs Up Pole Claim, TIMES (Moscow), Aug. 24, 2007 (quoting Viktor Posyolov)).
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world's largest nuclear-powered cold water vessel.2 5 7 In 2007 alone,
Russia conducted military exercises in the Arctic at a level not seen
since the Cold War.258 Last year, the Russian energy giant Gazprom
even selected finalists in a search for partners to develop the Barents
Sea basin, in spite of a conflicting Norwegian claim to the same
area.25 9
More to the point, Russia benefits from being the first to sub-
mit its continental shelf proposal. Not only does it have the aid of ex-
perience, but its second submission will be considered by the CLCS in
2009, likely well before the submissions of any other Arctic State.2 6 °
Regardless of the position a given country may favor,2 6 ' it is clear that
the window of opportunistic guesswork is closing: UNCLOS imposes a
ten-year timeframe on all broad-margin States that intend to claim
areas of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.26 2 States
that ratified UNCLOS prior to May 13, 1999, such as Russia and Nor-
way,2 6 3 must submit a claim before May 13, 2009.264 All other States
must complete a submission within ten years of from the date of acces-
265thnosion. In light of the totality of these circumstances, it is not surpris-
ing that Russia is proceeding as if its continental shelf claim will be
approved.
Further, the CLCS already is a functional body, and has
promulgated recommendations on submissions made by Brazil and
Ireland and is in the process of considering several others.2 6 6 In July
of 2000, the UN General Assembly approved a Mining Code under the
ISA that specifically governs the polymetallic nodules beyond national
257 Revkin, supra note 16.
258 Stuhltrager, supra note 11, at 40.
259 Krauss et al., supra note 2.
260 Russia must deposit a final submission with the CLCS prior to May 2009 or
forfeit the right to claim an extended continental shelf. Further, preparing a con-
tinental shelf submission is an extremely intensive and time-consuming process,
requiring an "executive summary" that contains the charts indicating the pro-
posed limits; how the criteria of Article 76 were applied, the names of members of
the CLCS who provided advice with respect to the delineation, information regard-
ing related disputes, and comments from other States regarding how the data re-
flect upon the claim. See SUAREZ, supra note 30, at 184.
261 See Krauss et al., supra note 2 (providing an overview of the recent speculative
actions taken by different countries in the Arctic without much deference to
UNCLOS).
262 SUAREZ, supra note 30, at 2.
263 Norway ratified UNCLOS in 1996, followed by Russia in 1997. Canada and
Denmark did not ratify the Convention until 2003 and 2004 respectively. Holmes,
supra note 6, at 331.
264 SUAREZ, supra note 30, at 2; Krauss et al., supra note 2.
265 SUAREZ, supra note 30, at 2.
266 Negroponte, supra note 126.
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jurisdiction, allowing for the first exploration contracts to be signed by
initial investors. 26 7
This was the first tangible regulatory role played by the ISA.
Although commercial mining of the deep sea floor may still be a long
way into the future,26 if the CLCS awards Russia a continental shelf
drawn to its own specifications, other nations likely will be forced to
accept those boundaries or submit to voluntary methods of dispute res-
olution, at least until they submit their own proposals. Therefore,
amid all the uncertainty and despite the ambiguity inherent in the
Convention, Russia appears to be leading the way under the existing
framework.
E. Forestalling Instability: the Necessity of Adhering to UNCLOS
Procedure
While it may be peculiar that geologic structures might dictate
ownership of resources,269 Russia has obtained a competitive edge by
operating persistently and adhering to the provisions of the Conven-
tion. Most importantly, other Arctic States have seen the writing on
the wall. Aware of the undeniable progress Russia has made, the
other littoral countries have been stirred from their casual observance
of UNCLOS within the Arctic, and have undertaken new cartographic
data-gathering expeditions to claim as much territory as they can
under the parameters of the Convention.270 In fact, following Russia's
2001 submission, eight other countries began work on filing their own
CLCS submissions under UNCLOS.2 7'
For example, Canada recently changed the nature of its Arctic
claims to conform to UNCLOS procedure, by departing from simple
reaffirmations of past assertions of sovereignty and instead beginning
work on a continental shelf proposal due for submission in 2013.272
267 Maria Gavouneli, From Uniformity to Fragmentation? The Ability of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea to Accommodate New Uses and Challenges, in
UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND NEW CHALLENGES TO THE LAW OF THE SEA: TIME BEFORE
AND TIME AFTER 205, 220 (Anastasia Strati et al. eds., 2006). The ISA's Mining
Code, although still inchoate, already includes extensive regulations for excavat-
ing marine minerals in the international seabed Area. See INT'L SEABED AUTH.,
REGULATIONS ON PROSPECTING AND EXPLORATION FOR POLYMETALLIC NODULES IN
THE AREA (2000), available at http://www.isa.org.jm/en/documents/mcode (follow
"Mining Code" hyperlink).
268 Gavouneli, supra note 267, at 220.
269 Putin's Arctic Invasion, supra note 214.
270 Krauss et al., supra note 2.
271 These new claims included submissions from Brazil, Australia, Ireland, New
Zealand, Norway, France, Mexico, and a collective submission on behalf of France,
Ireland, Spain, and the U.K. Coston, supra note 220, at 154 n.41.
272 Boswell, supra, note 225.
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Even the United States participated in a joint seabed-mapping mission
in the Beaufort Sea last month, a region widely considered the "top
prize in the Arctic oil rush."2 7 3
1. Alternate Methods of Apportionment
Nevertheless, resistance to the applicability of UNCLOS
within the Arctic persists.2 7 4 In the event that several Arctic Nations
succeed in declaring an extended continental shelf, UNCLOS does not
prescribe a procedure for settling any disputes beyond its general dis-
pute resolution provisions and requirements of equity.2 7 5 Accordingly,
distinguishing between geologic formations, even in conformity with
the Convention's "natural prolongation" language, is a subject rife
with contention. For example, Ted Nield of the Geological Society in
London has singled out Russia's proposed claim as meritless, contend-
ing that the Lomonosov Ridge is not actually part of any continental
shelf, arguing instead that it is the departure point where two ocean
floor plates spread apart. 6
Further, applying UNCLOS as customary international law in
the case of Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the ICJ found that it
would not be possible or appropriate "to establish that the natural pro-
longation of one State extends, in relation to the natural prolongation
of another state, just so far and no farther, so that the two prolonga-
tions meet along an easily defined line" under the circumstances. 7
This would seem to cast doubt on the viability of scientific expeditions,
such as the Russian mapping mission mentioned above, as the exclu-
sive means of establishing sovereignty or economic rights.
However, allotting sovereignty based on external theories such
as proportionality or equidistance,2 78 rather than the requirements of
UNCLOS, is even more troublesome. Despite the inextricable rela-
tionship between economic interests and geology under the Conven-
tion, geography alone is unlikely to be dispositive, or even very helpful.
The economic interests of each nation depend almost wholly on an area
in which the continental shelf topography of all five Arctic Nations is
interconnected and indeterminate. 9 Scientific attempts to quantify a
273 Id.
274 See generally Jarashow et al., supra note 203.
275 "The delimitation of the continental shelf between [neighboring] States shall
be effected by agreement on the basis of international law .. .in order to achieve
an equitable solution." UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 83(1).
276 Putin's Arctic Invasion, supra note 214.
277 Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 47 (Feb. 24).
278 Holmes, supra note 6, at 325.
279 See, e.g., Nathan Read, Note, Claiming the Strait: How U.S. Accession to the
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention Will Impact the Dispute Between Ca-
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nation's continental shelf in geological absolutes are generally un-
helpful because such efforts usually cannot provide an easily-identifi-
able boundary.28 °
Renowned scholar and ICJ member Judge Shigeru Oda has
opined that the principle of equidistance would lead to the most equi-
table solution to the drawing of maritime boundaries between neigh-
boring States.2 8 ' However, Judge Oda predicates this opinion upon
the idea that the EEZ and continental shelf limitations should be iden-
tical. 2 2 Given that this is not the case under the Convention, equidis-
tance is similarly unable to provide definite boundaries. Moreover,
there is no mandatory legal principle that requires delimitation based
upon such a principle of equidistance.28 3 Certainly it may be applied if
it leads to the equitable solution always urged by UNCLOS, but State
practice has always permitted deviation.28 4
Finally, in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ also
explicitly rejected an argument to delimit the continental shelf based
on equidistance. 2 5 Rather, it stressed that a State's continental shelf
should not infringe upon the natural prolongation of another nation's
territory.28 6 In the most recent pertinent decision by the ICJ, involv-
ing a case between Libya and Malta, the court emphasized the impor-
tance of the Convention's equitable principles as well as all other"relevant circumstances" when resolving a dispute regarding the de-
limitation of a continental shelf.28 7
Ultimately it remains unclear how the Arctic will be appor-
tioned under the UNCLOS framework, even after sovereign rights
have been recognized. Yet the most likely outcome is that the first
Arctic State successfully to delimit an extended continental shelf will
set the standard for the others, and any ensuing disputes will be ad-
dressed as they arise. Not only is this process more in line with the
operation of UNCLOS than a predetermined method of apportionment
imposed externally, but it has already begun.
nada and the United States Over the Northwest Passage, 21 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 413, 433-35 (2007).
280 See Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 92 (Feb. 24).
281 See generally ODA, supra note 70, at 579.
282 Id.
283 Tunis. v. Libya, 1982 I.C.J. at 79.
284 Id.
285 See North Sea Continental Shelf, (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 32,
54-56 (Feb. 28).
286 Id. at 47.
287 Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 18 (June 3).
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2. The Impracticality of a New Agreement
Given the present difficulties associated with escalating claims
to the Arctic, there have been calls to create a regional supplement to
UNCLOS, negotiated under the auspices of the Convention but among
only the Arctic States.2"' Such an "Arctic Treaty" could establish a
separate forum to assess the competing claims of sovereignty and pro-
vide for a loose but insular affiliation between Member States to ad-
dress the specific goals of each. However, given the pace of global
warming, this is not a preferable option to ratifying UNCLOS.
The concept of an "Arctic Convention" is hardly a novel idea.
In fact, there is wide support for a more narrowly-tailored agreement
that would address the host of Arctic issues, from environmental deg-
radation and commercial fisheries.. 9 to sea floor drilling and dispute
resolution.2 9 ° To avoid chasing the tail of dogma 2 9 ' in blind support of
the infallibility of UNCLOS and its labyrinthine provisions, two alter-
native frameworks will be considered briefly: the Antarctic Treaty Sys-
tem and the Moon Treaty. Both of these international conventions
address the shared use of resources and have been suggested as mod-
els for a potential Arctic convention.29 2
In particular, the rush to reclaim the Arctic is "reminiscent of
early efforts to conquer Antarctica." '2 9 3 The Antarctic Treaty System is
a unique international legal regime and has developed international
288 See generally Erika Lennon, A Tale of Two Poles: A Comparative Look at the
Legal Regimes in the Arctic and the Antarctic, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 32
(2008).
289 The Arctic Council was established in Ottawa in 1996 in order to coordinate
"common Arctic issues" and efforts at sustainable development among regional na-
tions, but its scope is confined primarily to environmental issues. See ARCTIC
COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL (1996), availa-
ble at http://arctic-council.org/section/declarations.
290 See, e.g., Dubner, supra note 241, at 21 (2005) (proposing an "Arctic indicator"
as a regional legal regime with the sole responsibility of protecting the fragile en-
vironment); Holmes, supra note 6, at 346-47 (proposing an "Arctic Treaty" based
on the Antarctic Treaty System); Jarashow et al., supra note 203, at 1589 (conclud-
ing that accession to UNCLOS is the most efficient mechanism to balance compet-
ing interests).
291 This particular wording is taken from the work of visionary musician Maynard
James Keenan. TOOL, Third Eye, on /ENIMA (Volcano 1996).
292 These treaties are only two examples of many potential options for resolving
maritime boundary disputes. Submitting all such territorial disputes to the ICJ,
for example, has been suggested as one alternative to constructing an entirely new
legal regime. See Jarashow et al., supra note 203, at 1631-37.
293 Stuhltrager, supra note 11, at 40.
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cooperation for almost fifty years.2 9 4 When the Antarctic Treaty was
negotiated in 1959, it designated the continent as a completely demili-
tarized zone of peace, halting all claims of sovereignty in order to focus
on exploration and scientific research.2 95 Drilling was also prohibited
without the approval of three-fourths of the nations with voting power.
However, the South Pole is an inexact parallel. Antarctica, in
contrast to the Arctic, is an expansive landmass, and over 90% of the
Antarctic is entirely inaccessible. Measuring 14 million square kilo-
meters, the continent is larger than the U.S. and Mexico combined,
and dwarfs the Arctic.2 9 6 While there is extensive marine biodiversity,
the mineral and hydrocarbon resources of the Antarctic do not exist in
the same commercially exploitable quantities as they do in the North
Pole.2 9 7 Several effete attempts have been made to stake a claim of
sovereignty in the pursuit of Southern Ocean seabed mining, but these
are without precedential value.2 9 s The most dispositive reason mili-
tating against using the Antarctic Treaty system as a basis for a new
Arctic regime is simply that some Arctic States are far more concerned
with their own claims of sovereignty than with environmental
issues.2 9 9
The Moon Treaty is another regime that employs substantially
similar terms to UNCLOS regarding restrictions on sovereignty. 30 0 In
fact, the Moon Treaty specifically prohibits claims of exclusive sover-
eignty by classifying all resources outside earth as the common heri-
tage of mankind. 3 1 Also, like the Arctic, the moon is inhospitable yet
increasingly more accessible due to improvements in technology. Fi-
294 In 1959, all claims to Antarctica were suspended by the Antarctic Treaty. See
Antarctic Treaty, art. IV, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794; see also Central Intelligence
Agency, The 2008 World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publi-
cations/the-world-factbook/geos/ay.html [hereinafter Antarctic World Factbook].
295 See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 294, art. IV.
296 See Antarctic World Factbook, supra note 294.
297 See id.
298 Donald R. Rothwell & Stuart Kaye, Law of the Sea and the Polar Regions:
Reconsidering the Traditional Norms, in LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 40, at 525,
536 (1994). The Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Ac-
tivities ("CRAMRA") was drafted as a separate instrument to the Antarctic Treaty.
However, the treaty failed to receive critical support and essentially was delivered
stillborn, preserving the status quo. See Convention on the Regulation of
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, June 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 859 (not in force).
299 Jarashow et al., supra note 203, at 1650.
300 See Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies art. 11, Dec. 5, 1979, 1963 U.S.T. 21.
301 David Collins, Efficient Allocation of Real Property Rights on the Planet Mars,
14 B.U. J. Sc. & TECH. L. 201, 204 (2008).
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nally, only a handful of States are parties to the Treaty,3" 2 further lik-
ening it to the Arctic situation. Nevertheless, the Moon Treaty also
fails to provide an adequate model for an Arctic Convention. Not only
has the treaty been poorly received in general because of the perenni-
ally troublesome notion of common heritage,3 °3 but the U.S. has re-
mained outside this treaty as well. If the point of a new Arctic regime
is to tailor provisions to the needs of all the Arctic States, the Moon
Treaty proves insufficient.
V. AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY IN THE ARCTIC AND UNCLOS
The United States stands in a unique and unprecedented posi-
tion regarding Arctic resources: it has one of the largest continental
shelves in the world, and America is among the elite in maritime
power, technology, and commerce.3 ° 4 Yet the U.S. lags far behind in
the pursuit of new opportunities in the Arctic due to its failure to ac-
cede to UNCLOS.
A. American Abstention from the Convention and the Part XI
Mining Regime
The U.S. currently resides in a gray area regarding UNCLOS.
For most of the Convention's existence, the United States Senate has
steadfastly refused ratification for fear of the obligations it would place
upon American economic interests.30 5 Yet even despite clinging to its
non-party status for a quarter of a century, America nevertheless has
come to defer to the Convention in virtually all other material aspects.
One of the fundamental issues addressed by UNCLOS, and ul-
timately the overriding provision that spawned internecine opposition
in the United States, was the Convention's regulation of proprietary
interests over naturally-occurring seabed minerals on the continental
shelf. Firmly grounded in the fundamentals of the new international
economic order, the operation of the International Seabed Authority
did indeed slant heavily against deep-seated free market en-
trepreneurialism and capitalist tenets.30 6
As a result, when UNCLOS opened for signature in 1982, Pres-
ident Reagan declined to make the U.S. a signatory, citing problems
with the "the provisions in Part XI . . .relating to the deep seabed
302 Adam G. Quinn, Comment, The New Age of Space Law: The Outer Space
Treaty and the Weaponization of Space, 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 475, 482 (2008).
303 See John Adolph, Comment, The Recent Boom in Private Space Development
and the Necessity of an International Framework Embracing Private Property
Rights to Encourage Investment, 40 INT'L LAW. 961, 972 (2006).
304 Negroponte, supra note 126.
305 Bates, supra note 33, at 757.
306 See KLEIN, supra note 29, at 331-32.
IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL WARMING
mining regime"30 7 as a pretext upon which to reject the Convention
out of hand. In fact, the ISA was perceived as so detrimental to the
economic interests of the United States that the institutions created
under Part XI have even been referred to pejoratively as "'an OPEC of
the oceans .... Reagan articulated six fundamental prerequisites
to ratification. 30 9 These unsatisfied, the United States withdrew to
pursue its own provisional mining regime based on domestic legisla-
tion 310 and reciprocal arrangements to resolve issues of competing
claims.311 America was quite content to allow a maritime laissez faire
system to continue, 312 applying the rules of the economy to ocean re-
sources, since it had the most technological competence and invest-
ment potential to exploit vast areas of the sea. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has not yielded from this position, twice prevent-
ing the Convention from being presented to the full Senate for a vote
after it entered into force in 1994. 3' 3
Yet despite its problems, over the course of the years the Con-
vention has gained support from the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of the U.S. Government. Indeed, UNCLOS has served as
307 Id. at 21-22.
308 Id. at 321 n.21.
309 These objectives "required a deep seabed mining regime that would: (1) 'not
deter development of any deep seabed mineral resources to meet national and
world demand'; (2) 'assure national access to these resources by current and future
qualified entities to enhance U.S. security of supply, avoid monopolization of the
resources by [the Enterprise] . . . .'; (3) 'provide a decisionmaking [sic] role in the
deep seabed regime that fairly reflects and effectively protects the political and
economic interests and financial contributions of participating states'; (4) 'not al-
low for amendments to come into force without the approval of the participating
states . . . .'; (5) 'not set other undesirable precedents for international organiza-
tions'; and (6) 'be likely to receive the advice and consent of the Senate. In this
regard, the [Clonvention should not contain provisions for the mandatory transfer
of private technology .... "' Dinmukhamed Eshanov, Hot Markets: The Future of
the American Legal Practice in the Regulation and Business of Greenhouse Gases,
16 N.Y.U. ENVT'L. L.J. 110, 141 n.157 (2008) (quoting Statement Before the House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Comm., (1982) (statement of James L. Malone,
Special Representative of the President for the Third U.N. Conference on the Law
of the Sea)).
310 See, e.g., Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94
Stat. 553 (1980) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (2000)).
311 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 321. In 1984, the U.S. signed a provisional under-
standing with several other industrialized nations to prevent overlapping claims
that might arise under UNCLOS. See Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep
Seabed Matters, Aug. 3, 1984, 1409 U.N.T.S. 463, available at untreaty.un.org/
unts/6000l_120000/14/8/00026380.pdf.
312 See Anand, supra note 40, at 274-75.
313 See CARTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 848.
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"the cornerstone of U.S. oceans policy since 1983. ' '314 In 1980, antici-
pating both the mass appeal of UNCLOS and the potential conflict
with American interests, Congress passed the Deep Seabed Hard Min-
eral Resources Act 3 15 in order to establish a provisional regime that
advanced the interests of the mining industry.3 16 The Act is still in
force, having been reauthorized by Congress in 1986, four years after
UNCLOS was available for signing.3 1 7
Even after refusing to sign the Convention, Reagan issued an
Ocean Policy Statement in 1983 announcing that the United States"accepted, and would act in accordance with, the Convention's balance
of interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans-everything but
deep seabed mining."3 1 In an executive order several years later,
Reagan further elaborated that the United States would maintain a
territorial sea of twelve nautical miles in compliance with UNCLOS,
and that negotiations would remain open to develop a deep seabed
mining regime.3 1 9 Faced with an obstinate Senate that refused UN-
CLOS in 1994, after the amended Convention was submitted for ratifi-
cation, President Clinton issued a similar proclamation recognizing a
contiguous zone consistent with UNCLOS in 1999.320
Finally, U.S. domestic case law also reflects an intention to re-
frain from action that would be antithetical to the purposes of UN-
CLOS.3 2 ' Indeed, many federal court cases consider and apply
provisions of the Convention, considering it an expression of custom-
ary international law at minimum. 32 2
B. Status of American Economic Interests in the Arctic
In spite of the imperfect domestic status of UNCLOS, the
United States government has recognized the importance of establish-
314 Negroponte, supra note 126.
315 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, supra note 310.
316 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 340.
317 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-507, 100 Stat. 1847 (1986).
318 Negroponte, supra note 126.
319 Holmes, supra note 6, at 331 n.56.
320 Id. at 334.
321 See United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 24 F. Supp. 2d 155,
159-60 (D.P.R. 1997).
322 Since UNCLOS has been submitted for ratification, many jurisdictions have
implied a manifest intent of the United States to be bound by the Convention. See
Royal Caribbean Cruises, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 159-60 (holding that pending the Con-
vention's rejection or ratification by the Senate, the U.S. is bound to uphold the"purpose and principles" of UNCLOS); United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588
(1992) (stating that UNCLOS and its baseline provisions reflect customary inter-
national law).
IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL WARMING
ing an extended continental shelf in the Arctic based on the Conven-
tion's terms. In conjunction with a partner of the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"), Congress commissioned a
study in 2001 to collect data that would support a claim based on an
extension of Alaska's continental shelf.32 3 After several Arctic cruises,
the study has collected data suggesting that America could claim an
extended continental shelf off the coast of Alaska about the size of
500,000 square kilometers, roughly the size of California. 324
Further, an interagency task force was organized in 2007
under the State Department for the purpose of delimiting the Ameri-
can continental shelf.325 Dubbed the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf
Project, this task force has dispatched individual and collaborative
voyages, each one charged specifically with collecting data that would
shore up a claim under Article 76 of UNCLOS.326
The military, too, has expressed concern over the faltering
American presence in the Arctic. A letter from three military com-
mands to the Joint Chiefs of Staff last spring stated that the U.S. was"at risk of being unable to support our national interests in the Arctic
regions."327 It warned that the lack of American preparation to deal
with Arctic claims is at a crisis point, due to climate change and esca-
lating economic activity.328
Commercial interest in the Arctic also is patently obvious. In
fact, it was the American mining industry that first observed the pres-
ence of the manganese nodules on the seabed floor and advocated for
exclusive rights in order to ensure secure investments. 329 The manga-
nese nodules that were so determinative of both the structure and the
ensuing response to UNCLOS are found in some of the greatest con-
centrations in the North Pacific Ocean. 330 This finding suggests a sim-
ilar distribution near the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas, all
three of which surround Alaska.
The inevitable market incentive to exploit Arctic resources al-
ready is experiencing growing pains. In 2008, a Las Vegas-based com-
pany called Arctic Oil & Gas levied a claim to virtually all the seabed
petroleum in the Arctic, which it estimates to be around 400 billion
323 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, DEFINING THE LIMITS OF THE U.S. CONTINENTAL SHELF,
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/continentalshelf/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) [hereinaf-
ter U.S. CONTINENTAL SHELF PROJECT].
324 Krauss et al., supra note 2.
325 U.S. CONTINENTAL SHELF PROJECT, supra note 323.
326 Id.
327 Revkin, supra note 16.
328 See id.
329 See ODA, supra note 70, at 616.
330 HOLLICK, supra note 15, at 8.
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barrels of oil.33 1 While acknowledging that the vast petroleum depos-
its are the "common heritage of mankind," the firm nevertheless filed a
claim with the UN for exclusive Arctic rights.3 3 2 Even in spite of
American abstention from UNCLOS, Arctic Oil & Gas argues that the
polar region needs a private "'lead manager' to organize a multina-
tional consortium of oil companies to extract undersea resources
responsibly and equitably."3 3 3
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that anything will come of such
claims given their lack of international recognition under UNCLOS.
In the absence of the legal certainty that the Convention provides for
sovereign rights over an extended continental shelf, it is unlikely that
enough U.S. companies will be willing or able to secure the necessary
financing to exploit Arctic resources, or to keep other countries from
exploiting them. 3 4
1. American Interests Will be Harmed by Lack of Participation
Not only will the U.S. face several obstacles to the advance-
ment of economic interests in the Arctic, but continued abstention
from the Convention will dangerously weaken its future claims of sov-
ereignty in the region. Currently the U.S. is unable to assert a claim
to the Arctic that would be internationally cognizable because
America's ability to claim an extended continental shelf is in jeopardy.
Also worrisome is that America remains unable to influence any new
policy decisions regarding the Arctic that are made pursuant to the
Convention.
The Convention provides institutional methods through which
the other Arctic States are able to protect their rights under UNCLOS,
which may well come at the expense of American interests. Instru-
mental bodies such as the ISA's executive body, the Council, will as-
sume a highly influential role in the Arctic. In particular, the Council
is responsible for promulgating the policies that would apply to Arctic
mining.3 35 The ability of the U.S. to play a part in the Arctic and pro-
tect against potentially inimical mining policies require participation
in the Authority, and in the decision-making Council in particular.3 36
The CLCS presents a similar problem. The CLCS process is
kept secret, and only Member States may appoint commissioners to
331 Randy Boswell, U.S. Firm Lays Claim to 'Potentially Vast' Arctic Oil Re-
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take part in the decision and review the data submitted by other coun-
tries.337 Acceptance or rejection of a shelf proposal is final, and such a
crucial decision may well depend on a variety of subjective factors,
such as "the knowledge, the experience, and occasionally the bias of
the scientist involved. 338
Without an American commissioner, the U.S. cannot evaluate
the content or feasibility of continental shelf submissions set to be filed
by the other Arctic States.339 The element of time also adds to the
sense of urgency, since a State must wait ten years from the date of
ratification before submitting a continental shelf claim to the CLCS.34 °
Further, UNCLOS does not allow any reservations to the
treaty other than those explicitly provided for when acceding to the
Convention.341 It is possible to amend the Convention, but only as a
full Member State.342 UNCLOS established a ten-year prohibition on
amending the Convention subsequent to its entry into force.343 Since
UNCLOS entered into force in 1994, a year after the date of the sixti-
eth ratification,344 this moratorium expired on November 16, 2004.345
Accordingly, only Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Russia currently
are able to proffer amendments to UNCLOS regarding Arctic mining.
But should any such amendment be ratified before America accedes to
the Convention, the U.S. would not be able to avoid its application
when signing.
The Senate's recalcitrance is based largely on a fear that the
U.S. would be unable to play a dominant role within the Convention.
Yet by refusing to ratify UNCLOS, the U.S. stands as one voice
against the force of the entire Convention within the Arctic. Should
337 Prows, supra note 1, at 275. The consequence of such a "confidential" process
is the stripping of all "details of the CLCS's deliberations from the public executive
summaries of its recommendations." Id. at 276.
338 Howard, supra note 110, at 851 (quoting Colin Woodard, Who Resolves Arctic
Oil Disputes?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 20, 2007, at 1).
339 It is conceivable, for example, that Canada might be tempted to claim a conti-
nental shelf extending into the Arctic legitimately based on its broad continental
margin, but exceeds what its jurisdiction might otherwise be if the U.S. were a
party to UNCLOS. There is no established forum under which the United States
could dispute such a maneuver, and it could be used as a bargaining advantage in
other disputes.
340 Krauss et al., supra note 2.
341 UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 309.
342 Id. art. 312.
343 Id. art. 312(1).
344 The Convention provides that the date of its entry into force would occur one
year after the date of the sixtieth ratification. Id. art. 308(1).
345 Samuel E. Logan, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the Legal
Challenges, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 253, 271 n.135 (2005).
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the United States persist in its refusal to ratify UNCLOS, it will find
itself in the same or weaker position if and when the CLCS recognizes
the sovereign claims of other Arctic States that permit the exploitation
of the pole's wealth. Indeed, regardless of American involvement, UN-
CLOS has established "a de facto regime governing the deep seabed,
and U.S. interests are better served by active participation in the UN-
CLOS regime than by sitting on the sidelines." '3 46
2. Enforceability of UNCLOS Even Without Ratification
Perhaps the most dangerous threat to American sovereignty in
the Arctic is the enforceability of UNCLOS as part of American law,
either as positive treaty-based domestic law or customary interna-
tional law. While the reach of the Convention may be debated under
both headings to some extent, it cannot help but affect the United
States' Arctic designs.
Although still pending ratification, at times UNCLOS may be
assigned virtually the same legal status as if it were a properly ratified
treaty, albeit in a roundabout and piecemeal fashion. If President
Reagan's culling UNCLOS for acceptable provisions bound the United
States to a majority of the Convention's provisions, then President
Clinton committed the United States to the remainder, including the
amended Part XI mining regime, by signing the Convention in 1994 in
spite of an obstinate Senate. 347
The court in United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises bore this
out, holding that UNCLOS "carrie[d] the weight of law from the date
of its submission by... President [Clinton] to the Senate."3 48 In find-
ing that the Convention applied to an oil spill within U.S. waters, the
court reasoned that the United States was obliged to honor the agree-
ment to which the executive branch has tentatively made the United
States a party, and that the submission of the treaty alone to the Sen-
ate was indicative of the America's "ultimate intention" to be bound by
the Convention.3 49 Following this line of reasoning, albeit to some-
what of an illogical extreme, the Supremacy Clause would place UN-
CLOS atop the hierarchy of domestic laws in spite of non-
ratification. 350
Even acknowledging the suspect reasoning of this theory, em-
phasis still will fall to customary practice to determine the extent of
346 Cook, supra note 4, at 685.
347 Michael A. Becker, International Law of the Sea, 42 INT'L LAW. 797, 798-800
(2008).
348 United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 24 F. Supp. 2d 155, 159
(D.P.R. 1997).
349 id.
350 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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U.S. presence in the Arctic, which could well lead to unsatisfying re-
sults. Indeed, America's ambiguous relationship to UNCLOS has done
little to affect the Convention's operation, its actions actually facilitat-
ing its application as binding customary law.
Customary international law is a peculiar construct, and legal
duties may arise passively from principles of major legal systems, 351
especially in insular areas such as the Arctic. While a State usually
cannot be bound by a treaty that it has not ratified, it does not follow
that the United States would be immune to UNCLOS requirements.352
In fact, UNCLOS is precisely the sort of dominant legal system whose
principles may be applied to all nations, regardless of their status
under the Convention. As discussed above, UNCLOS often is consid-
ered legally enforceable in American courts, and the United States has
specifically incorporated most of the Convention into its own maritime
policy. Such actions in conformity with UNCLOS may result in the
adoption of the ISA's policies in the Arctic as binding customary law.
Additionally, the practice of States in a regional grouping, such
as the Arctic Circle, can result in special customary law for all of the
similarly-situated States, applicable only in that area.353 Further
jeopardizing American interests is that the doctrine of the continental
shelf in particular has been considered "instant customary law,"35 4
provided that the practice of States whose interests are affected is suf-
ficiently extensive and uniform to indicate a legal obligation.355 If the
other Arctic nations continue to assert sovereign rights, uniformly
based on an extended continental shelf, America may easily be ham-
strung by provisions that it does not acknowledge but nonetheless
prove binding. By way of example, if an American mining corporation
were to form a consortium under a bilateral treaty to harvest sea floor
resources with a State that was already a member of UNCLOS, and
sought to mine in an area already recognized by UNCLOS as an exten-
sion of another Arctic State's continental shelf, or even merely outside
its own EEZ, it would contravene the Convention and also subject both
countries to international judicial proceedings.35 6
351 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(1)(c) (1987); id. at
cmt. c.352 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 16, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331. Even further, the United States has not ratified the Vienna Con-
vention, thereby weakening any argument that it could prevent the enforcement of
UNCLOS provisions without express acquiescence.
353 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. e (1987).
354 SUAREZ, supra note 30, at 35-37; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 102 n.2 (1987).
355 North Sea Continental Shelf, (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb.
28).
356 KLEIN, supra note 29, at 345.
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It has been suggested that the universal right of navigation
under UNCLOS3 57 might be able to provide an alternate legal basis for
claiming Arctic economic rights.3 5 s However, finessing this argument
into a circumvention of the Convention's obligations and limits within
the Arctic would be nothing more than unilateralism disguised as po-
litical legerdemain. The blithe dismissal of UNCLOS in favor of reli-
ance on the Grotian conception of the freedom of the high seas in order
to legitimize American rights over Arctic resources mistakenly ignores
the global support and position of authority UNCLOS has achieved.
Rather, in all likelihood, America might be forced to accept the
modus vivendi3 59 in the Arctic that has developed over two decades of
widespread UNCLOS observance. If the Senate continues to blockade
attempts to ratify the treaty, other contingencies should be considered,
such as negotiating alternate regimes or implementing UNCLOS via
executive order.3 6 ° Should several "uncooperative members of the
Senate" force the United States to the sidelines, "the short-term politi-
cal costs of resubmitting UNCLOS [as an executive agreement would
be justified] by America's need to be a full player in the remainder of
this Arctic competition." '3 6 1
C. Non-Ratification is no Longer a Defensible Position
It is plausible that, given the broad reach of the Convention, it
may lack the specificity needed for the sort of regional dispute that is
357 The high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes and open to every nation,
with the enumerated freedoms of navigation, overflight, fishing, and the rights to
lay submarine cable, construct artificial islands, and conduct scientific research.
UNCLOS supra note 55, arts. 87-88.
358 See generally Howard, supra note 110.
359 This concept does indeed give rise to binding obligations and has no clear dis-
tinction between other treaties, despite its provisional nature. BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1026 (8th ed. 2004).
360 Although not a treaty, the President has the power to pass an executive order,
similar to the way in which President Reagan approved select provisions of the
Convention in 1988 while still abstaining from the mining regime. Holmes, supra
note 6, at 331 n.56. Pursuant to the executive powers of Article II of the Constitu-
tion, the President may, of his own accord or with the authorization of congres-
sional legislation, negotiate an executive agreement to incorporate UNCLOS in its
entirety into U.S. domestic law. Two significant trade agreements, NAFTA and
the WTO, were negotiated by the President alone and only later submitted to Con-
gress, which passed upon the "treaties" without the formal constitutional "advice
and consent" from the Senate required by the Constitution. Nevertheless, both
these agreements are as powerful as any formally-negotiated treaty. See generally
JEANNE J. GRIMMETT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WHY CERTAIN TRADE AGREE-
MENTS ARE APPROVED AS CONGRESSIONAL-ExEcuTrvI AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN
AS TREATIES (2002), available at fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9553.pdf.
361 King, supra note 8, at 353.
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likely to emerge in the Arctic. Indeed, the Convention's judicial and
administrative mechanisms were designed to protect the universal in-
terests of mankind "as a moral community,"362 not to further individ-
ual State interest. Further, the Convention is beginning to show signs
of its age, and after twenty years of its presence in international law,
many things have changed.363
Indeed, both selective reliance and unilateral action threaten
to disrupt the efforts to create "an orderly regime for exploiting re-
sources and protecting the Arctic environment under international
law."364 Given the potential for conflict of the former and the damage
to international standing of the latter, neither option is appealing.
Admittedly, UNCLOS is not ideally suited to address every as-
pect of a regional dispute, such as competing claims of Arctic sover-
eignty, given its broad scope and various ambiguities. Yet regardless
of policy rationale, it is clear that the lack of U.S. participation is no
longer justifiable. Both previous American legal authorities regarding
the continental shelf, the 1945 Truman Proclamation and Geneva Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf from 1958, effectively have been sup-
planted by UNCLOS, and the Convention is the only international
agreement that may be relied on in the near future to secure rights
and resolve disputes.
Moreover, the American chief negotiator to the 1994 Imple-
menting Agreement stated that "[w]e have been successful in fixing all
the major problems raised by the Reagan Administration."3 65 Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, the Agreement ensured that
"[a]mendments to the deep seabed mining regime could not be adopted
without U.S. consent. '36 6 The administration of George W. Bush also
supported ratification, in order "to avoid the increasing costs of being a
non-party," 367 and in 2002, Bush classified UNCLOS as one of five
treaties in urgent need of ratification. 368 Nevertheless, an intractable
Congress has continued to block the Convention, thereby cutting off
America's most direct path to asserting a claim in the Arctic.
362 Ulrich K. PreuB, Equality of States-Its Meaning in a Constitutionalized
Global Order, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 17, 35 (2008).
363 Gavouneli, supra note 267, at 205.
364 Boswell, supra note 331.
365 Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Having Won Changes, Is Set to Sign Law of the Sea,
N.Y .TIMES, July 1, 1994, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9401E2DD1739F932A35754COA962958260.
366 Oxman, supra note 120, at 351.
367 Negroponte, supra note 126; see also Krauss et al., supra note 2 (noting the
continued deadlock in the Senate even though the current administration de-
scribed the ratification of UNCLOS as an "urgent need").
368 King, supra note 8, at 336.
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Simply stated, accession to the Convention and adherence to
its procedure based on a prolongation of Alaska's continental shelf
would greatly facilitate American claims to Arctic resources, providing
uniformity, predictability, and legal security. Accession also would
demonstrate solidarity within the international community, bolstering
a faltering reputation, and allow UNCLOS to "function as originally
conceived."3 69 Most important, ratification would give the U.S. a voice
to assert its point of view and a recognized method to exercise jurisdic-
tion within the Arctic.
Continuing to do nothing is an untenable position. It would be
foolish and risky to assume that the U.S. can maintain ad infinitum
the desultory and passive approach upon which it currently relies.3 7 °
With the ever-increasing pressure from coastal States to augment
their authority in a manner that would alter the balance of interests
struck in the Convention," 1 the United States "need[s] to be in the
game, at the table. '372 Thus, unless UNCLOS is ratified, or a separate
Arctic convention is negotiated, the United States will remain tenu-
ously wedged between Scylla and Charybdis, unable to assert a recog-
nized claim of sovereignty, influence international maritime policy, or
make substantive changes to parts of the Convention it finds
troubling.
VI. CONCLUSION
Global warming in the Arctic has placed the Convention in un-
charted waters, so to speak, further emphasizing the need for an au-
thoritative international legal regime in the polar north. For the first
time in history, the strategic importance of the Arctic may extend be-
yond the superficial and hypothetical. As the supply of mineral and
fuel sources within traditionally-recognized State jurisdictions is
shrinking steadily precisely at the time of the greatest Arctic melting,
the result has been that "everyone is pitching for action." 37 3 The Arc-
tic ice cap is nearly only thirty percent of its size twenty-five years
ago.3 7 4 Should the North Pole become something more than "a frozen
backyard, the fences matter," even if it is unclear where they are at the
moment.3 7 5
369 Eshanov, supra note 309, at 142.
370 Negroponte, supra note 126.
371 Id.
372 Krauss et al., supra note 2 (quoting Adm. James D. Watkins, Chairman of the
United States Commission on Ocean Policy).
373 Reynolds, supra note 17.
374 Stuhltrager, supra note 11, at 40.
375 Krauss et al., supra note 2.
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Signed in December of 1982 and entering into force in Novem-
ber of 1994, UNCLOS represents a veritable constitution for the law of
the sea. Yet the Convention is also something more: it provides an
integrated and comprehensive regulatory regime for virtually all mari-
time issues which "has come to prevail over any other expression of
State power by the sheer force of its existence."376 While this system
contains flaws, its mere existence is something of a rarity in interna-
tional law, the bulk of which is predicated on voluntary consent at
every turn. Indeed "[tloo few step back to observe that this is a strong,
innovative and comprehensive global ... treaty governing two-thirds
of the planet. 3 77
At least for the time being, UNCLOS should govern claims of
Arctic sovereignty for a wide variety of reasons, ranging from economic
interests to international comity. The benefit of such a "constitution"
of the seas is that it was designed to be comprehensive enough to
adapt to changes by creating "institutional means for the formation of
a collective will [and] by specifying the conditions under which the col-
lective can claim supremacy over the individual spheres. '378 True to
form, the legal framework of UNCLOS is flexible, premised on balanc-
ing the customary freedom of the seas with the tendency of recidivist
States to expand towards the high seas.379
Global warming and the opening of new passageways to the
Arctic undoubtedly have added a new dimension to the international
law of the sea. Yet the Arctic still remains the province of UNCLOS.
For all intents and purposes, global warming has consolidated the au-
thority of UNCLOS and marked the beginning of the end for the free-
dom of the high seas in the Arctic. Irrespective of the environmental
implications in the region, climate change has caused a departure in
the international approach to the Arctic, shifting the paradigm away
from physical dominion and towards control over resources on the sea
floor.
Unprecedented access to untapped resources may soon cause
an international "gold rush" with renewed fervor with the ability to
reawaken dormant hostilities, necessitating a uniform approach. In-
deed, claims of sovereignty driven by the mere possibility of exploiting
Arctic resources are unlikely to be tempered by immediate impracti-
calities. The "acquisitive impulse" set off by technological develop-
ments is not directly related to actual capabilities, especially when
combined with national interest,380 and the process of establishing
376 Gavouneli, supra note 267, at 205.
377 Stevenson et al., supra note 247, at 490.
378 Stuhltrager, supra note 11, at 36.
379 See Gavouneli, supra note 267, at 206.
380 HOLLICK, supra note 15, at 10.
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claims typically has far outpaced technological means, commercial via-
bility, and even proof of significant resources.3 s1
Despite its diffuse nature, for the moment UNCLOS remains
the only regime prepared to address the myriad issues likely to arise
from the acceleration of claims to the Arctic. Considering the potential
wealth present, the importance of claiming an extended continental
shelf under the Convention lies in the possible economic benefits to be
gained as much as those to be lost.3 s2 Reluctance to conform to the
provisions of UNCLOS should not result in wasted opportunities. Al-
though UNCLOS might not survive the experiment in the Arctic in-
tact, its true ability to govern the law of the sea and the distribution of
resources should be tested.
381 For example, as early as the 1940s, the United States industry and govern-
ment were interested in claiming areas of the sea floor up to 150 miles offshore
and up to depths of 600 feet. At the time, the deepest offshore well operated at 60
feet. Id. at 10-11.
382 CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMiTs, supra note 142, at 6.
